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APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT 
LUNAR MODULE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM 
By Reinhold H. Dietz, Donald E. Rhoades, 
and Louis J. Davidson 
Manned Spacecraft Center 
SUMMARY 
The lunar module communications system was  designed to be compatible with 
existing lunar module systems and to maintain the high standard of reliability and ver- 
satility imposed upon the command and service module communications system. The 
lunar module communications system w a s  to provide essential communications between 
the lunar module and the Manned Space Flight Network on earth, between the lunar 
module and the command and service module when the latter was in lunar orbit, and 
between the lunar module and the extravehicular crewmen on the lunar surface. Space 
and weight restrictions were more critical for the lunar module than for the command 
and service module; therefore, the command and service module equipment could not 
be used in the lunar module on a direct-interchange basis, and new designs were re- 
quired. The system was to provide voice and telemetry from the lunar module crew- 
men and systems and was to act as the communications relay between crewmen on the 
lunar surface and the other communications units within the space-flight network. The 
system was to supply ranging information essential to the rendezvous of the lunar mod- 
ule with the command and service module after lift-off from the lunar surface. This 
system was  developed successfully within the period imposed by program objectives. 
The developmental phases closely approximated those of the command and service 
module equipment. Qualification tests were designed to ensure satisfactory operation 
under all environmental conditions encountered on Apollo missions of any duration. 
Developmental problems generally were associated with the environmental and mission- 
life requirements. Modifications to circuit design, packaging, and manufacturing tech- 
niques were incorporated to correct these problems. The experience gained from the 
the areas of management, procurement, testing, operations, and design. 
I 
I development of this system produced many recommendations for future programs in 
INTRODUCTION 
The lunar module (LM) communications system was  designed to provide commu- 
nications between the LM and the Manned Space Flight Network (MSFN), between the 
LM and the command and service module (CSM), and between the LM and the extra- 
vehicular (EV) crewmen on the lunar surface. In this document, the development of 
the LM communications system is reviewed from the initial concepts to the operational 
system used on the Apollo 11 mission. The experiences outlined in this document have 
resulted in information and insights useful f o r  future design and development of near- 
space and deep-space communications systems. In this regard, particular note should 
be made of the section entitled "Recommendations fo r  Future Manned-Spacecraft 
Programs. ' I  
Concept 
The LM communications system was  designed to provide the following types of 
communications between the spacecraft, the EV crewmen, and the MSFN. 
1. Precision deep-space tracking and ranging 
2. High- bit - ra te  telemetry 
3. Voice 
4. Biomedical (electrocardiogram) data 
5. Extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) data 
6. Television (TV) 
7. Keyed continuous wave (emergency key) 
A s  mission planning evolved, concepts for the LM communications system 
changed. Additional communications requirements developed, such as the following. 
1. High-capacity up-data-link system 
2.  Telemetry between the LM and the CSM 
3 .  Up-link-voice backup 
4. Voice-relay and conference capability 
5. Additional channels for biomedical and EMU data 
6. Ranging data between spacecraft using the communications systems 
The LM communications system functioned at  short ranges (e. g . ,  LM to CSM) 
and at  lunar ranges (e. g . ,  LM to MSFN). The frequencies fo r  these two ranges were 
determined early in the program. The VHF band was selected for  short-range com- 
munications, and the S-band was selected fo r  lunar-distance communications. The 
VHF frequencies presented few developmental difficulties; data-channel requirements 
were low, and prior experience could be used. 
lunar 
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Experience accumulated by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in i t s  unmanned 
and planetary programs led to serious consideration of S-band frequencies for  
lunar-distance communications. The S-band selection for lunar-distance communica- 
tions was a compromise among equipment availability, frequency allocations, circuit 
losses, and antenna gains at  the allocated frequencies. A window with high propaga- 
tion of the ca r r i e r  wave and low galactic-noise levels was selected in the S-band. 
The unified S-band system that w a s  selected was similai  to the system being de- 
veloped for  the CSM and allowed transmission of all data on one car r ie r .  Two sub- 
ca r r i e r s  were used on both the up-link frequency and the down-link freqwncy to 
multiplex voice and data. The use of one car r ie r  for all communications functions 
minimized the system weight, volume, heat-dissipation, and power-consumption 
requirements . 
The deep-space tracking and ranging function of the LM communications system 
required data of sufficient accuracy and resolution for the descent and ascent opera- 
tions of the LM. Again, the unified S-band system was selected for this function. The 
initial range measurement was calculated by accurately measuring the transmission 
time of a pseudorandom-noise (PRN) code and subtracting the time delays of the com- 
munications system. The PRN code could be turned off, and continued range computa- 
tion could be obtained by Doppler-count integration. 
r 
During the early phases of the program, the method of providing voice, data, and 
ranging functions between the LM and the CSM and between the LM and the EV crewmen 
went through several  iterations (including one receiver and one transmitter,  two re -  
ceivers and three transmitters,  and two receivers and two transmitters) as a result of 
changing mission requirements. The VHF-communications method that was selected 
consisted of two VHF/amplitude-modulation (AM) receivers  and two VHF/AM transmit- 
t e r s ,  each using two frequencies. Voice, data, and ranging information were modulated 
on the VHF ca r r i e r  by keying the car r ie r  on and off at the respective data ra tes .  
In the final concept, the LM communications system included an S-band t rans-  
ceiver, an S-band power amplifier, a two-channel VHF transceiver, a signal-processor 
assembly (SPA), a portable TV camera, a digital up-link assembly (DUA), a pulse- 
code-modulation and timing-electronics assembly (PCMTEA), an antenna system, and 
the necessary switches and RF cables. The communications system had the following 
characterist ics.  
1. While the crewmen were in the LM, a hardwire umbilical cord routed the 
received voice signal to the headset and the voice and biomedical data to the communi- 
cations system for transmission. 
2. Transducers,  which were located at  various places on the LM and within the 
various systems,  provided LM systems data to the LM communications system. The 
transducer outputs were converted to a data format that was suitable for transmission 
to the MSFN. 
3. During lunar-stay operations, a TV camera could be connected directly to the 
communications system and could provide transmissions in either black and white o r  
color. Also, voice and EMU-data transmissions from EV crewmen were processed 
and routed by the communications system. 
3 
4. The S-band link was  used fo r  voice and data transmissions from the MSFN to 
the LM and for voice, biomedical, EMU, pulse-code-modulation (PCM) telemetry, 
emergency-key, and TV transmissions from the LM to the MSFN. In addition, the 
S-band transceiver acted as a transponder for the PRN ranging code. The retrans-  
mitted PRN ranging code, which was coherent with the received code, allowed the 
MSFN to determine the LM range accurately. The coherent-phase relation between 
the ca r r i e r  transmitted and received from the spacecraft allowed measurement of the 
range rate  at the MSFN by means of a two-way Doppler measurement. 
5. The VHF link was operated in either a simplex mode o r  a duplex mode. Nor- 
mal LM/CSM inflight voice communications were performed using simplex operations, i 
whereas the LM/extravehicular-activity (EVA) voice and EMU-data communications 
were performed using duplex operation. In addition, low-bit-rate PCM-data transmis- 
sion by V H F  was available from the LM to the CSM during those portions of the mission 
when the line of sight between the LM and the MSFN was lost. 
6. Conference capabilities were provided among the LM, the CSM, and the MSFN 
and among the LM, the EVcrewmen, and the MSFN using both S-band and VHF equipment. 
Corn rn u n icat ion s Function s 
Operation of the LM communications system during the inflight and lunar-stay 
phases of a mission is described in the following paragraphs and is shown in figures 1 
and 2. 
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Inflight communications on the earth 
side of the moon. - The S-band eauiDment 
-_ .. S-band erectable -.--. 
. 
Note: PLSS = portable 
'. life-support system. . -. 
Figure 2. - Lunar-surface 
communications. 
was used for inflight communica(io& be- 
tween the LM and the MSFN when the LM 
was in line of sight with the MSFN. The 
communications system transmitted 
voice, biomedical data, PCM telemetry 
data, and the retransmitted PRN ranging 
code. The communications system re- 
ceived voice, data, and the PRN ranging 
code from the MSFN. 
The VHF voice communications be- 
tween the LM and the CSM were accom- 
plished by simplex operation of one 
channel (designated VHF A) of the two- 
channel VHF transceiver. The second 
channel (VHF B) was available as a back- 
up. The VHF ranging was accomplished 
by receiving the ranging code on the VHF 
B receiver and retransmitting the ranging 
code from the VHF A transmitter. This 
mode was  used in operations on both the 
earth side and the far side of the moon. 
A three-way voice conference among the CSM, the LM, and the MSFN could be 
provided by real-time relay switching, which w a s  available on the LM, on the CSM, 
and at the MSFN. 
Inflight communications on the far side of the moon. - During the phase of the 
mission when the LM and the CSM were not in line of sight with the MSFN. S-band I 
~ 
communications with the MSFN were not possible. However, communications between 
the CSM and the LM were possible. 
I In addition to the two-way VHF voice link, a one-way data link existed from the 
LM to the CSM. The LM VHF B transmitter was used to transmit low-bit-rate data. 
A data-storage unit (basically, a tape recorder with record and playback capabilities) 
on board the CSM was  used to record the data. The tape-recorder speed during this 
phase of the mission allowed 2 hours of recording time. When the CSM was in line of 
sight with the MSFN, the tape-recorder speed was  increased by a factor of 32, and the 
recorded LM data were transmitted to the MSFN in 2 to 3 minutes. 
I 
I 
Lunar-surface communications. - Before egressing from the LM, the commander 
o r  LM pilot deployed the VHF antenna used for communications between the LM and the 
EV crewmen. After leaving the LM, the EV crewmen erected and positioned the S-band 
erectable antenna, which was stored in a cylindrical container located in quad area num- 
ber  1 of the descent stage. 
: 
5 
The V H F  link was used fo r  voice and data transfer between the LM and the EV 
crewmen. Operation was duplex: voice transmissions from the LM to the EV crew- 
men were on VHF A, and voice and EMU-data transmissions from the EV crewmen to 
the LM were on VHF B. If a malfunction occurred in the VHF equipment, duplex opera- 
tion would continue with voice transmission f rom the LM to the EV crewmen on VHF B 
and with voice transmission from the EV crewmen to the LM on VHF A. Because EMU- 
data transmission on VHF A does not exist, the EMU data would be lost during this 
backup mode. 
I 
1 The S-band link w a s  used for voice, data, and TV transmissions between the LM and the MSFN. The signals were combined and transmitted by frequency modulation ! 
1 (FM) of the 2282.5-megahertz car r ie r .  
During EVA, communications with the CSM were by MSFN relay. The time r e -  
quired for a radio transmission between the earth and the moon is approximately 1. 2 to 
1 .5  seconds. Of course, the relay operation could occur only when the MSFN and the 
CSM were in  line of sight. 
PROGRAM PLAN AND MANAGEMENT 
Reliability, weight, schedule, and cost were the primary considerations involved 
in the formulation and management of the program. To ensure successful completion 
of the program, activities were planned and coordinated to provide the maximum flow 
of data from the design and analysis phase through the hardware development and quali- 
fication phase to final delivery. Major milestones during design and analysis were the 
conceptual-design freeze and the development and testing of prototype hardware. After 
the conceptual-design freeze, prototype models were manufactured and subjected to 
environment a1 design- limit and endurance qualification tes t s  . Simultaneously , integra- 
ted tes ts  were planned for the major components of the system. After completion of 
the prototype qualification tes ts  and before the integrated tests,  the qualified flight 
equipment was scheduled for delivery to the contractor. The original program plan is 
outlined in figure 3. Details of the test  philosophy and plan a r e  in the section entitled 
"Test Program. I '  
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Contract go-ahead 
Subcontractor 
Assembly vendors 
Design and analysis 
Conceptual-design freeze 
Deliver antenna mockup to pr ime contractor 
Fabricate experimental models 
Deliver experimental models 
To subcontractor 
To pr ime contractor 
Design freeze: service test model 
Fabricate: service test model 
Deliver: service test model 
To subcontractor 
To pr ime contractor 
Erectable antenna and TV drawing 
Mechanical and thermal  design freeze 
Fabricate prototype models 
Deliver prototype models 
To subcontractor 
To pr ime contractor 
Reliability-assurance tests 
Prototype I assemblies 
and tool ing design release 
Prototype II assemblies 
Design freeze LRP-1. LRP-2 
Instal lat ion and interface design freeze 
Erectable antenna and TV design freeze 
Fabricate prototype models 
Quali f icat ion tests 
Production tooling design release 
Fabricate qual i f ied models 
Deliver qual i f ied models 
To subcontractor 
To pr ime contractor 
Tooling design and development 
Special test equipment (bench set requirements) 
Field support 
Tra in ing 
Prototype III assemblies 
Mnnthc 
PC "5r- 
12 sets 01 assemblies) 
Drawing release 
PC s 
V 
V 
Notes: 
(11 PCS * parts, components, subassemblies 
(2)  LRP = LM replaceable package 
V 
PC 5 1-1 
M < Erectable antenna and TV dI assemblies except erectable ntenna and TV 
V 
Y7 
PCSl/I 
Environmental W Endurance 
Al l  assemblies except erectable antenna and T V V  
V E r e c t a b l e  antenna and TV 
PCS I / I 
Integration and acceptance tests p a  
V Y -v1 2 w 3  
L 1 
Figure 3. - Program order of key milestones and events. 
Program P l a n  
The original program plan was modified because more data were gathered than 
were anticipated during design-feasibility tests (DFT 's) and integration tests. These 
data, combined with schedule and cost trade-offs, resulted in the elimination of some 
test models and test programs at the vendor level. Other tests were added - such as 
the LM compatibility tests at the prime-contractor facility, the vehicle environmental 
tests (both thermal vacuum and vibration) at the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), 
and the LM/CSM/MSFN RF-compatibility tests at MSC. 
i 
The program plan also included provisions for  reliability, weight, electromagnetic- 
interference (EMI), design and development, spares ,  and program control. 
Reliability control. - To attain the reliability goals, the basic design was opti- 
mized, and possible modes o r  sources of failure in the design were determined and 
corrected. After the design phase, equipment failures that were produced in the test 
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phases were analyzed to determine their effect on the equipment reliability, and the 
modifications necessary to correct the problems were incorporated. (For  further 
details on system reliability, see the section entitled "System Reliability and 
Performance . I t )  
Weight control. - During the early phases of LM development, weight minirniza- 
tion w a s  a concept that greatly influenced the system design. Preliminary designs and 
weight estimates were examined to ensure that the weights and s izes  of par ts  and com- 
ponents were minimized and to ensure that materials and packaging techniques were 
consistent. 
proved. The most notable system change in this category was the pressurization of 
two electronic replaceable assemblies (ERA'S) in the system. (See the section entitled 
"System Design and Analysis.") 
However, weight restrictions were eased as the payload capacity of the ! 
1 Saturn V launch vehicle became better defined and as some system equipment was im- 
I 
Control of EMI. - The EMI-control plan included basic EMI-suppression tech- 
niques and cabling control and grounding control methods. Vendors were required to 
submit detailed EM1 test plans for approval before testing. Equipment changes were 
monitored to determine their  effects on EMI. In addition to the EM1 requirements a t  
the black-box level, EMI-compatibility tes ts  of the LM/CSM/EVA equipment were 
planned and conducted. 
Design and development control. - The design and development control plan in- 
cluded provisions for continuing review of all new design concepts, drawings, and 
specifications with representatives from the subcontractor engineering, reliability, 
and manufacturing organizations. Individual par t  serialization that permitted trace- 
ability of all processes,  tests,  inspections, and fabrication was  required. 
Spares control. - In the spares-control method that was developed during the 
Apollo Program, a replaceable-functional-assembly concept was used. During early 
system development, the spares  plan included the use of the resul ts  of reliability fail- 
u r e  analyses, maintenance analyses, and the past history of related hardware pro- 
grams to determine the number of spares  needed. Spares were located at the NASA 
John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and the contractor facilities; a par t s  spare ,  which 
permitted quick-repair capability, was located a t  the subcontractor facilities. 
Program control. - Program control is discussed in the following section. 
Program Management 
The program-management plan provided f o r  MSC monitoring and control at all 
levels of the program. Flexibility and quick reaction were important because require- 
ments constantly changed during critical program phases. The system-management 
structure is shown in figure 4. 
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Figure 4. - Lunar module communications and management structure. 
Manned Spacecraft Center. - At MSC, management of the various subsystems was 
assigned to subsystem managers within the Engineering and Development Directorate. 
Each subsystem manager was responsible to the Manager of the Apollo Spacecraft 
Program Office (ASPO) for the successful management of schedules, costs, perform- 
ance, reliability, weight, and other program aspects that are considerations in the 
timely delivery of quality hardware. The subsystem manager accomplished the tasks 
by associating with the actual engineering, manufacturing, and test efforts at both the 
prime-contractor and subcontractor facilities. Official direction to the contractor was 
given through the established ASPO channels. 
The subsystem manager also participated in the preparation of specifications, 
test  plans, and qualification and reliability cri teria and in consultation and analyses, 
as required. In addition, coordination was required among the directorate and division 
and the individual project engineers in the branches. Coordination also was required 
with other subsystem managers and functional organizations within MSC. 
During all phases of the program, many problems arose that required technical 
resolution between MSC and the contractor. The subsystem manager was  responsible 
f o r  the resolution of these technical problems with the contractor engineering subsys- 
tem manager. Work packages - which consisted of task delineation, manpower as- 
signments, and schedules - were monitored at  both the contractor and vendor facilities. 
Contract negotiations also were reviewed to ensure proper task direction and accom- 
plishment within the guidelines set by MSC. 
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Prime contractor. - Management of the LM program was the responsibility of the 
prime contractor, who in turn assigned a major part  of the communications system 
management to a subcontractor. Operational communications (except for  the DUA, 
PCMTEA inflight and EVA antennas, cables, and connectors) were contracted to the 
subcontractor. 
Establishing an organization similar to  that of MSC, the prime contractor as- 
signed responsibility for  subsystem management within the engineering division. 
subsystem manager was  responsible to the project office fo r  the development of the 
subsystem. Close association and cooperation were required with vendors and with 
manufacturing, ground-support, reliability, and vehicle-testing groups. During the 
conception, design, development, testing, and delivery of the communications equip- 
ment, primary emphasis was  placed on working with the subcontractors. After the 
equipment was delivered, emphasis shifted to in-house coordination. After delivery of 
the LM to  KSC, management emphasis shifted to monitoring the progression of the sub- 
system through KSC. During the various flight missions, system performance was 
monitored closely for  adequacy of mission support and possible corrective action. Dur- 
ing all phases of the program, technical actions were coordinated through the MSC 
subsystem manager. If changes to the subsystem were proposed after the design freeze, 
the engineering subsystem manager obtained proj ect-management approval for  sub- 
mission of the changes to MSC for  final approval. 
The 
I 
Subcontractor. - The subcontractor Program Management Office (PMO) controlled 
the entire LM corkract effort, including all prime contractor/subcontractor and 
subcontractor/subcontractor vendors contractual agreements. The PMO support groups 
prepared standards, policies, and general procedures for documentation, test  programs 
and procedures, training, field support, engineering standards, and the reliability pro- 
gram. These standards, policies, and procedures were imposed upon all subcontractor 
vendors (including subcontractor in-house activities) and were used during the 
subsystem-integration activity a t  the subcontractor facility. 
As the program developed, difficulties were experienced in maintaining efficient 
coordination between the PMO and the subcontractor in-house activities. These activi- 
t ies  were of considerable importance to the subcontractor LM-communications effort 
and included system integration, VHF-transceiver development, and erectable-antenna 
development. By mid-1966, the PMO fo r  communications was relocated within the sub- 
contractor organization to reduce duplication of effort and to improve efficiency. 
For  each communication ERA, the project-engineering groups (within the PMO) 
developed requirements in conjunction with the pr ime contractor. The engineering 
groups reviewed and approved system specifications, set  schedule milestones, approved 
cost estimates, employed management techniques to  monitor and guide the progress of 
the program continuously, and took appropriate action to ensure the meeting of all ob- 
jectives. They were responsible for  all technical agreements with the prime contrac- 
tor .  All technical information flowed through the PMO project-engineering groups to 
the prime contractor. The project-engineering groups provided the technical and 
managerial link throughout the communications-system development f rom inception to 
final system delivery and acceptance by NASA. However, detailed design and develop- 
ment effort was not a PMO project-engineering function. 
ment, production, and test  implementation were the responsibility of in-house 
engineering groups and subcontractor vendor engineering groups. 
The detailed design, procure- 
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SYSTEM DES IGN AND ANALYS I S  
Past experience with Project Mercury and the Gemini Program demonstrated the 
feasibility of manned- spacecraft communications. The complexity of lunar missions, 
the public investment and interest, and the national and international significance of 
the flights increased the need for a reliable, comprehensive, and flexible communica- 
tions system. The basic functional and performance requirements, as they evolved for 
the first lunar landing, a r e  shown in table I. 
TABLE 1. - FUNCTIONAL AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS 
~~~ 
Function 
Two-way voice 
LM/MSFN 
LM/CSM 
LM/EVA 
EVA/EVA 
Data-voice relay 
PCM telemetry 
Biomedical data 
Trajectory determinatior 
VHF ranging 
Up-link data and voice 
Television 
- Emergency key 
Performance required 
Normal voice: 90-percent word intelligibility (design goal) 
Backup voice: 70-percent word intelligibility 
Normal voice: 90-percent word intelligibility: maximum 
range of 550 n. mi. 
Normal voice: 90-percent word intelligibility; maximum 
range of 1 n. mi. 
Normal voice: 90-percent word intelligibility: maximum 
range of 0.5 n. mi. 
Capability to relay data and voice from EVA to MSFN 
Capability to relay voice from CSM to MSFN 
Maximum bit e r ror  rate of 1 in lo6 bits (design goal), both 
highbit rate and low bit rate; capability to transmit low- 
bit-rate data to CSM; maximum range of 320 n. mi. 
Capability to transmit analog electrocardiogram from LM 
and relay through LM from EVA 
Determination of trajectory by phase-coherent turnaround 
of PRN ranging rode and integration of two-way RF 
Doppler data 
Capability toturnaround range tones to arange of 
200 n. mi. 
Capability to receive discrete commands and complex 
26 
digital information 
Probability of accepting an incorrect message: 10- 
Probability of rejecting a correct message: 
Voice: 70-percent word intelligibility 
Capability to transmit video information with 500-kHz 
Copy accuracy: 70 percent at  25 characters/min 
bandwidth 
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System Requirements 
Environmental requirements depended upon equipment location. Except for  the 
electronics package i n  the S-band steerable antenna, which was located outside the LM, 
the majority of the electronic equipment was in the aft equipment bay (fig. 5). In the 
original design concept, the pressure environment of the aft equipment bay was  planned 
to be either atmospheric pressure o r  absolute vacuum (except during the short period 
when earth orbit was  being achieved). However, as the LM design developed, the aft 
equipment bay was found to maintain a partial p ressure  that was in the corona region 
for electronic equipment. This finding brought about a revision of system requirements 
and necessitated extensive redesign in three of the ERA'S. 
Thermal requirements were based on operation of the ERA'S on the water-glycol- 
cooled mounting rails in the aft equipment bay. The thermal requirements for ERA 
design were based on the cold-rail temperature, which varied between 35" and 135" F.  
Vibration requirements were not well defined until LM vibrational tes t s  were 
performed on a ground-test spacecraft with excitation levels based on data obtained 
I 
-265.M 
View looking forward 
Figure 5. - Aft-equipment-bay cold rails and ERA arrangement. 
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during Saturn -d evelopm ent missions . Additional environment a1 requirements were 
established for humidity, fungus, sand and dust, explosion, shock, and acceleration. 
More than any other factor, weight restrictions dictated the basic design of the 
LM communications system. Weight is directly related to power utilization and thus 
affects the electrical design. A 75-watt input to an ERA operating continuously for  
24 hours would require batteries weighing approximately 40 pounds (assuming an 
approximately 45-W-hr/lb battery). This weight of 40 pounds would infl: m c e  engine- 
thrust, fuel, and structural  requirements, and the weight of the equipment in the LM 
ascent stage would be multiplied almost tenfold. As a result of the emphasis on weight 
reduction, the LM communications system was less than one-half as heavy and r e -  
quired one-fourth less power than the comparable portions of the CSM communications 
I system. 
Because of LM weight restrictions, the power budget was critical. Therefore, 
efficiency in power use was also a major factor influencing the system design. 
When the LM contract was  awarded, the CSM contract had been in effect for  
approximately 2 years,  and the resulting knowledge was applied in the LM program. 
Therefore, the prime contractor was requested to use the same vendors for  comparable 
ERA'S. The vendors also were requested to retain the same basic design concepts and 
manufacturing techniques that were used for the CSM equipment. However, because of 
the more stringent weight and power restrictions, commonality was  not generally main- 
tained. For  example, weight and power requirements made an amplitron-tube design 
more  attractive than the traveling-wave-tube design used in the CSM. The amplitron- 
tube power amplifier weighed 16.8 pounds and required 72 watts; the CSM power ampli- 
fier weighed 32 pounds and required 90 or 167 watts, depending on mode selection. As 
a result  of these increased requirements, only four ERA'S were supplied by common 
vendors, and design concepts were not common with the concepts used in the CSM 
equipment . 
The initial system requirements for functional switching of communication modes 
differed considerably from the system requirements that were finally used. As con- 
ceived, mode switching was  to be accomplished with a selector switch. This procedure 
simplified the crew switching functions but provided l e s s  flexibility and required more 
complicated electrical switching. After crew review, greater  flexibility in manual 
crew switching was incorporated in the design. This flexibility was implemented; how- 
ever, it increased the complexity of mode switching and required a better understand- 
ing of the system by the crew. Redundancy became a requirement to increase system 
reliability and also required manual crew switching in most cases. 
Electromagnetic-interference requirements were imposed to ensure compatible 
operation of the communications system with other equipment. Conducted and radiated 
EM1 from the ERA'S and associated components, as well as susceptibility of the sys- 
tem to EMI, was designed to be at the minimum levels imposed by EM1 specifications. 
Other operational requirements included interface compatibility with the electrical 
power system, the instrumentation system, the displays and controls, the environmen- 
tal control system, the LM guidance computer (LGC), and crew personal equipment. 
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System Analysis 
A basic tool f o r  designing and analyzing the design of a communications system 
is the study of RF signal compatibility between communication points. In the following 
paragraphs, the techniques used in design of the LM communications system a r e  
described. A detailed discussion of S-band design analysis may be found in reference 1. 
I 
The VHF design analyses were of importance to the communications-system de- 
velopment. In addition to the standard parameters analyzed in other Apollo communi- 
cations links, the VHF link between the LM and the CSM required consideration of 
polarization loss. Polarization purity of the LM circularly polarized antennas was 
poor as a result of the omnidirectional-coverage requirement, the limited s ize  of 
the antennas, and the proximity of the irregular LM structure.  The polarization 
impurity was a significant factor in determining the coupling between the LM anten- 
nas and the linearly polarized CSM antennas. 
The polarization characterist ics of the vehicle antennas must be known in re fer -  
ence to the vehicle coordinate axes. These characterist ics can be determined from any 
four of the six interdependent polarization components radiated by an antenna. However, 
all polarization components were measured to simplify performance of manual calcula- 
tions, if desired, during a mission. 
If the vehicle radiation data, the look angle of each vehicle, and the relative atti- 
tudes of the vehicles about their  common line of sight a r e  known, the polarization loss  
can be calculated, and the performance characterist ics of the communications link can 
be estimated. The adequacy of the communications link was  evaluated by estimating 
the performance in the design-reference mission. 
A support contractor used computer software to analyze each mission. The pro- 
gram was used to analyze the LM and CSM trajectories and vehicle-antenna radiation 
data to provide analyses of receiver signal strength compared to signal threshold for 
voice, data, and ranging. In the mission analysis report, proper antenna use was 
recommended for the various mission phases, and the expected performance quality 
was predicted. The report also provided circuit-margin profiles for  each combination 
of LM and CSM antennas. The circuit-margin profiles enabled the MSC to determine 
the effects of any selection of antenna combinations desired.  
The design and operation of the LM communications system are discussed in 
following subsections, Also, the developmental flight instrumentation (DFI) and the 
portable life-support system (PLSS) communications systems a r e  described. 
The transition from the original system configuration to the qualification-test con- 
figuration is discussed in the section entitled "Development . ' f  Major configuration 
changes after initial qualification a r e  discussed in the section entitled "Significant Modi- 
fications and Problems." 
System Design 
The operational communications system was composed of seven ERA'S, RF com- 
ponents, and antennas. These a r e  described in the following paragraphs. 
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The S-band transceiver (ERA- 1). - The S-band transceiver consisted of two iden- 
tical phase-locked receivers, two phase modulators with driver and multiplier chains, 
and a frequency modulator. The nominal power output was 0.75 watt. The receivers 
and phase modulators provided the ranging, voice, biomedical data, emergency keying, 
mission of TV, telemetry, biomedical data, and voice communications. The S-band 
operating frequencies were 2282.5 megahertz for transmission and 2101.8 megahertz 
for reception. 
l and telemetry transmit and receive functions. The frequency modulator provided trans- 
I' 
The S-band power amplifier (ERA-2). - The S-band power amplifier consisted of 
two selectable amplitrons (each having a power supply) and an input-output isolator. 
When power amplification was required, the selected S-band power amplitron amplified 
the S-band transceiver output to a nominal value (measured at the ERA-diplexer output) 
of 18.6 watts through the primary amplitron or  14.8 watts through the secondary 
amplitron. 
The VHF transceiver (ERA-3). - The VHF transceiver consisted of two receivers, 
two transmitters, and a diplexer. One transceiver provided a 296.8-megahertz channel 
(channel A) and the other a 259.7-megahertz channel (channel B) for simplex or duplex 
voice communications. Channel B also transmitted PCM data at the low bit rate and 
received biomedical data from an EV crewman. Channel B also received VHF ranging 
data, which then were retransmitted on VHF A to the CSM. The transmitter used a 
keyed on-off car r ie r  AM and delivered an average of 3.8 watts RF at the diplexer output. 
The SPA (ERA-4). - The SPA provided the interface between the various communi- 
cations electronics and processed voice, telemetry, and biomedical signals. The SPA 
consisted of audio centers for the two crewmen and a premodulation processor (PMP). 
The P M P  provided signal modulation and mixing, mode switching, and relay capability 
for transmissions from the CSM through the LM to the MSFN. The PCM data were 
routed to the PMP biphase modulator, which controlled the phase of the 1.024-megahertz 
telemetry subcarrier.  The 1.024-megahertz telemetry and the 1.250-megahertz 
voice and biomedical subcarr iers  were generated from the 5 12-kilohertz clock PCMTEA 
signal. 
A speech-processing network linked to the narrowband phase modulation (PM) in- 
put of the S-band equipment provided backup-voice transmission capabilities. Received 
voice signals were routed through the PMP to the headset volume-control circuits in the 
audio centers. The VHF channel B input had high-pass and low-pass fi l ters to separate 
voice and EMU data. 
I 
The P M P  received hardline biomedical data selected by manual control from each 
crewman fo r  S-band transmission. The PM mixing network and the FM mixing network 
processed the outputs of the 1.024- and 1.250-megahertz subcarriers,  which were a 
composite of voice, biomedical data, telemetry data, and EMU data. Backup-voice, 
FM video, P M  ranging, and emergency-key signals were not processed through the 
mixing networks but were supplied directly to the selected S-band modulator for base- 
band modulation. 
. 
An audio center fo r  each crewman provided individual selection, isolation, and 
amplification of audio signals received and transmitted by the communications system. 
Each audio center contained a microphone amplifier, a headset amplifier, a voice 
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circuit, diode switches, volume-control circuits, and isolation pads. Audio signals 
were routed to and from the VHF A, VHF B, and S-band systems and to and from the 
intercom bus through the audio centers. The intercom bus, which was common to both 
audio centers, provided hardline communications between the crewmen. 
I 
The S-band steerable antenna (ERA-5). - The S-band steerable antenna was a I 
26-inch-diameter parabolic dish with sleeved dipoles over a ground plane; it provided 
a gain of 20.5 decibels on the transmit frequency. The antenna operated either manu- 
al ly  or automatically and provided a coverage of 174" in azimuth and 330" in elevation. 
Once the antenna was  positioned manually within the RF capture cone, which had a 
coverage of approximately 25 O, it could be operated in the automatic-tracking mode. 
The steerable antenna transmitted and received communications data between the LM 
and the MSFN while the LM was in lunar orbit, during descent, and after landing. Dur- 
ing EVA on the lunar surface, the erectable antenna was  erected and placed in opera- 
tion by the EV crewmen. The steerable antenna provided a backup link with the MSFN 
during this portion of the mission. During pre-ascent checkout, the steerable antenna 
was activated again and operated throughout the lunar ascent and during rendezvous and 
docking of the LM and the CSM. 
The PCMTEA (ERA-6). - The PCMTEA processed signals from the various LM 
systems by using a preset format and the PCMTEA programer. After formatting and 
processing, the programer shifted the signals out of the register in a nonreturn-to- 
zero or  split-phase serial format. 
processing on the appropriate communications channel. 
The signals then were routed to the SPA for  further 
The DUA (ERA-"). - The DUA received MSFN digital commands, which were 
modulated on the 70-kilohertz subcarrier and which allowed the MSFN to control the 
LGC. The DUA demodulated, decoded, and applied the commands to the LGC. The 
digital commands were parallel to those available from the LGC on the LM display and 
keyboard (DSKY). The DUA also provided capability for  backup up-link voice on the 
same subcarrier. 
With the exception of the S-band steerable antenna (ERA-5), all ERA's were 
mounted on cold rails in the LM aft equipment bay. 
equipment-bay cold rails and the ERA's is shown in figure 5. The cold rails, which 
were cooled by a glycol-water solution, maintained the ERA temperatures within the 
specified operating ranges by heat transfer f rom the flanges by which the ERA was 
mounted to  the rails. The S-band steerable antenna was mounted at the end of a tripod 
boom, which was located on the LM starboard side (looking forward). Thermal paint 
and heaters controlled the steerable-antenna temperature. 
The arrangement of the aft- 
In addition to  the ERA's, the LM communications system consisted of RF coaxial 
lines, coaxial connectors, R F  switches, and the following antennas. 
The S-band erectable antenna was used for  S-band communications between the 
LM and the MSFN after lunar landing. The erectable antenna w a s  a manually unfolding 
assembly that consisted of a reflector, a feed assembly, an aiming device, a tripod, 
and an RF connection. The assembly w a s  transported in quad area number 1 of the 
descent s t  age. 
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When erected, the antenna was a 10-foot-diameter parabolic reflector illuminated 
with R F  energy by a pylon-mounted feed system; it provided a transmit gain of 34.0 dec- 
ibels. The reflector, which was supported on an extendable tripod, was a flexible mem- 
brane attached to 21 folding, radial, spring-loaded parabolic ribs. The spring-loaded 
release was actuated by the EV crewman to unfurl the reflector after he had opened the 
tripod and pointed it approximately. The feed pylon was of trombone construction, and 
the tripod was hinged and collapsible. 
1. Two S-band inflight antennas were used as backups to the steerable antenna. A 
spiral  cut in the cone of each antenna produced right-hand circular polarization. The 
radiation pattern provided a minimum gain of - 3  decibels (with respect to a circularly 
polarized isotropic radiator) over 85 percent of the spacecraft spherical area. This 
requirement was accomplished by manual switching between the two antennas. (. 
I Two VHF inflight antennas were used for communications with the CSM. The 
antenna was  designed to produce right-hand circular polarization. The radiation pattern 
provided approximately 47r -steradian coverage with a minimum gain of -6 decibels (with 
respect to the CSM linearly polarized V H F  antenna) when the antenna assembly was 
terminated in a free-space environment. This requirement was  accomplished by manual 
switching between the two antennas. 
The EVA antenna w a s  deployed after lunar landing by use of a T-handle located 
in the LM cabin. The EVA antenna was a pencil-cone antenna consisting of an 8-inch 
monopole and a 12-inch, 10-radial modified ground plane with an included angle of 40". 
The radiation pattern provided omnidirectional azimuthal coverage with a minimum 
gain of -3 decibels at 0" elevation. These gain magnitudes are with respect to a ver-  
tically polarized isotropic antenna with the EVA antenna in the erected position and 
terminating in a free-space environment, The EVA antenna was linearly polarized in a 
vertical plane. 
I 
The erectable antenna, the 30-foot cable, and the TV equipment were stowed in the 
descent stage. The remaining antennas were on the ascent stage of the LM and are 
shown in figure 6. 
, 
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Figure 6. - Lunar module communications-system antenna locations. 
System Operations 
The relationships between the seven ERA'S and the various antennas a r e  shown 
in figure 7. 
Audio inputs from the commander or LM pilot were hardlined to the respective 
audio centers located in the SPA. If a VHF t ransmit ter  was selected, the audio center 
routed the voice input to the correct VHF modulator and provided keying of the t rans-  
mitter.  After amplification to a peak power of approximately 7 .6  watts, the signal was 
routed through the VHF diplexer to the selected VHF antenna. Any received RF  signals 
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To LM guidance computer 
S-band erectable 
Figure 7. - Simplified block diagram of LM communications system. 
were routed through the VHF diplexer to the receiver section. The detected output of 
the receiver was routed to the PMP in the SPA, which further amplified and routed the 
signal to the audio centers. The transmit/receive selector switches and volume con- 
t ro l s  on the crewmen's control panels controlled headset audio signals. The VHF com- 
munication modes between the LM and the CSM are shown in figure 1. 
If the S-band equipment was selected, the audio input to the audio center was 
The 1.250-megahertz SPA-subcarrier output was routed to the S-band 
amplified and routed to the PMP, in which the 1.250-megahertz ca r r i e r  was frequency 
modulated. 
transceiver,  where the car r ie r  was phase modulated or  frequency modulated. The out- 
put was amplified in the S-band power amplifier and passed through the S-band diplexer 
to the selected S-band antenna. Normally, the steerable antenna was selected during in- 
flight operations. The steerable antenna had a gain of approximately 20 decibels. The 
erectable antenna, which had a gain of approximately 34 decibels, was fhe primary 
antenna used during the lunar stay. The two S-band inflight antennas were available as 
backups to the steerable antenna. Any received R F  signal was routed through the S-band 
diplexer to  the receiver section of the S-band transceiver. The detected PRN ranging 
code was  applied internally to the transmitter modulator from the receiver. The 
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detected-voice subcarrier was processed in the PMP; then, the detected audio signal 
was  routed to the audio centers f o r  amplification and headset selection. The S-band 
communication modes between the LM and the MSFN a r e  shown in figure 8. 
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Figure 8. - Apollo S-band modes. 
20 
where it was processed and relayed to the 
MSFN. The LM PCM data and TV signals R2 , 
R1, T1 = 296.8 MHz. channel A 
R2, T2 = 259.7 MHz. channel B 
RY T3 = 279.0 MHz. channel C 
R2 
Voiceldata ~ 
Rl, T1  = 296.8 MHz channel A 
R ~ ,  T~ = 259.7 MHZ channel B 
R3, T3 = 279.0 MHz channel C 
Voiceldata 
could be transmitted simultaneously with 5 l2  
(b). Primary backup mode. (c) Secondary backup mode. 
the EVCS voice and data. Lunar-surface 
Figure 9. - Extravehicular-communications-system modes of operation. 
T3 R3 
Signals from system sensors were applied to the PCMTEA for conversion to a 
PCM-data format.  During LM/MSFN line of sight, the PCM nonreturn-to-zero data 
were routed to the PMP for modulation and transmission on the S-band. Behind the 
were recorded. Real-time telemetry measurements on LM communications equipment 
a r e  listed in  table 11. 
I moon, low-bit-rate split-phase PCM data were transmitted to the CSM on VHF and 
A 
Voice 
Voice 
R 1  
All voice signals on the LM intercom bus could be recorded by the data-storage 
electronics assembly (a voice tape recorder) in the instrumentation system. 
- 
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TABLE 11. - REAL-TIME TELEMETRY MEASUREMENTS 
~ 
Measurement 
DUA up-link verify word 
S - band s teer  able - ant enna 
temperature 
Static phase e r r o r  
S-band transmitter R F  power 
S-band receiver AGC 
EVCS data 
Electrocardiogram 
PCMTEA internal oscillator 
failure-detect signal (3) 
PCM calibration voltage 
(85 percent) 
(15 percent) 
PCM calibration voltage 
Low 
-- 
-67" F 
-15" 
. 5  w 
0 V dc 
-- 
-- 
-- 
o v  
o v  
Range 
Norm High 
-- 
+153" F 
+15" 
1 w  
4.2 V dc 
-- 
-- 
-- 
5.0 V 
5.0 V 
sample/sec 
50 
1 
10 
1 
1 
(Analog) 
(Analog) 
(Event) 
10 
10 
Bit rate - 
ligh 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
-- 
-- 
x 
X 
X 
- 
Low 
Digital up-link commands, which modulated the 70-kilohertz subcarr ier ,  were 
received by the S-band transceiver and routed to the DUA for decoding. These com- 
mands were parallel to the LGC inputs and allowed the MSFN to provide data to the 
LGC. Capability for  up-link backup-voice transmissions also was provided on the 
70-kilohertz subcarrier.  The backup-voice signal was routed to the commander's 
audio center by a path that was separate from the normal-voice-processing path. The 
LM/MSFN/CSM/EVA communications links are listed in table 111. 
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Developmental-Flight- I nstrumentation Communications 
During the earth-orbital LM developmental flights, DFI was required. These 
flights were instrumented more heavily than the lunar operational flights and required 
more  transmission channels. All developmental flights were in earth orbit; thus, 
VHF/UHF could be used for data transmission. A C-band radar  was used to track the 
spacecraft. Telemetry transmitters and C-band-radar transponders were supplied to  
the prime contractor as Government-furnished equipment. The remainder of the equip- 
ment, supplied by the prime contractor, was as follows. 
1. Digital-command assembly (DCA) 
, 
2. Dual-feed coupler (DFC) 
3. Signal-sampling sensor 
4. Five-channel multiplexer 
5. VHF/UHF two-channel multiplexer 
6. VHF/UHF power divider 
7 .  VHF/UHF telemetry switch 
8. C-band power divider 
9 .  RF coaxial cable 
10. RF coaxial terminations and connectors 
11. VHF telemetry antennas (two in the LM, two in the spacecraft-LM adapter) 
12. Four C-band transponder antennas 
The LM/MSFN DFI communications 
links are shown in figure 10. Lunar 
modules 1 and 3 were the only lunar mod- 
ules that used these frequencies. With 
the exception of the DCA, which was  modi- 
fied and renamed the DUA, all equipment 
in the DFI communications system was 
removed after the LM-3 flight. 
A block diagram of the DFI equip- 
ment is shown in figure 11. The DFC was 
an active device at  the output of the 
PCMTEA. The DFC had two isolated- Y 
output PCM signals that allowed simulta- 
neous transmission of operational 
telemetry data on the S-band and V H F  
links. tween LM and MSFN. 
Figure 10. - Developmental-flight- 
instrumentation communications be - 
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I Figure 11. - Lunar module communications DFI equipment. 
Transmitter B (of the five VHF DFI transmitters) accepted the DFC output; 1 t ransmit ters  A, F, D, and E accepted various DFI modulation-packed outputs. The 
transmitter outputs were routed through a multiplexer, a diplexer, and the VHF/UHF 
scimitar -antenna system. 
Two C-band transponders and four C-band antennas provided the MSFN with 
ranging data during the earth-orbital missions. The PCM VHF DFI down link and the 
C-band ranging were prime functions of the system; S-band PCM transmissions and 
the S-band ranging were secondary functions. 
The DCA on the developmental vehicles received up-link commands from the 
450-megahertz receiver. The DCA provided the MSFN with capabilities for commands 
and updating of the LGC and allowed ascent-engine arming for  the final burn after crew 
egress .  
Portable Life-support System Communications 
Early in  the Apollo Program, the need was recognized for  a crew communica- 
b 
tions system f o r  use during EVA. 
hardware were  begun, and provisions for integrating a personal communications sys- 
tem into the life-support system were made. In 1963, a PLSS-development contract 
was awarded. The PLSS was  to provide all the life-support requirements of the EV 
crewman and was to include the personal communications system, which was later to 
be termed the  space-suit communicator (SSC) . 
Feasibility studies and production of breadboard 
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Space-suit communicator. - The SSC w a s  the f i rs t  system developed for lunar- 
surface communications. The SSC provided duplex-voice communications between one 
EV crewman and the spacecraft. The CSM or the LM was used as a relay station f o r  
communications to the MSFN. A completely redundant duplex-voice communications 
system was provided as a backup. The following channels of FM/AM telemetry data 
were processed and transmitted with the voice communications, 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Electrocardiogram 
PLSS-oxygen pressure 
Suit p ressure  
Suit-water inlet temperature 
Suit-water temperature differential 
PLSS-feedwater pressure 
PLSS-battery current or  voltage 
The SSC had solid-state components and was of a welded-cordwood construction. The 
SSC weighed approximately 4 . 5  pounds and used 10 watts at  15 to 20 volts. The RF out- 
put power was 75 milliwatts. After successful use on the Apollo 9 flight, the SSC was  
replaced by the EVCS. 
The EVCS. - Early in 1967, the Apollo Program requirement that provided f o r  a 
single EV crewman to work on the lunar surface w a s  changed to include two crewmen. 
The SSC had allowed only one crewman to transmit voice and space-suit telemetry to 
earth through the LM relay, and the SSC could not be modified reasonably to provide 
simultaneous voice and telemetry from two crewmen. Therefore, a new approach to 
EV communications was sought. Ultimately, a satisfactory system was devised by use 
of a relay technique. In essence, the first EVCS transmitted voice and data to the 
second EVCS. Then, the combined EVCS-1 and EVCS-2 voice and data were relayed to 
the LM by the second EVCS. The system parameters  and tolerances were chosen care-  
fully because of extensive use of relay techniques. The EVCS concept was  developed by 
the MSC to satisfy the following program requirements. 
1. NO changes were to be made in the existing LM communications system. 
2. Continuous telemetry data were to be relayed simultaneously to the MSFN 
from each of the two EV crewmen. 
3. Duplex-voice communications were to  be transmitted between the MSFN and 
at  least  one of the crewmen. 
4. Uninterruptible voice communications were to be transmitted between the 
crewmen. 
5. The required range was  to be 1 mile  f rom the LM and 0 . 5  mile between 
crewmen. 
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6. The telemetry channels would be increased to a minimum of 13. 
7. Program schedules would be met. 
Modes and manner of EVCS operation on the lunar surface a r e  shown in figures 2 
and 9. Exactly 2 years after the award of the EVCS contract (July 1967), the f i rs t  lunar 
landing was performed (July 1969). Because the EVCS was to be used first on Apollo 11, 
a thorough test program was pursued to ensure 100-percent reliability for mission 
success. 
1 
t 
Six prototype units were built with commercial par ts  in the contractor's model 
shop. These units were used to support the MSC evaluation tests, crew training, PLSS 
qualification, and the prequalification tests.  A structural problem, which was dis- 
covered in the telemetry model during prequalification tests, was corrected for the 
high-reliability par ts  and passed the qualification program. The flight models were 
identical to the qualification model. 
I qualification and flight EVCS models. One qualification model was fabricated with 
Each EVCS was acceptance tested at the contractor's facilities. Acceptance tes ts  
included base-line ambient, thermal, vibration, and final bench tests. The units were 
shipped to the MSC, where a preinstallation acceptance test was  performed before the 
units were installed in the PLSS. Then, the PLSS assembly was tested in several 
manned and unmanned vacuum-chamber runs. Interface tests with the associated 
spacecraft were  performed at  KSC to evaluate the total communications link. 
A method was required for operationally checking the PLSS communications sys- 
tem before egress from the LM. Because the RF radiation characteristics inside the 
LM were unknown, a hardline connection between the PLSS and the LM VHF trans- 
ceiver was proposed in the latter part of 1964. The hardline w a s  used (before opening 
the hatch) to check the communications modes that would be used on the lunar surface. 
The hardline consisted of a panel connector with a short coaxial adapter cable to con- 
nect the PLSS VHF directly to the vehicle VHF. Subsequently, tests verified that the 
PLSS communications system could radiate inside the LM, and the hardline was  not 
used during a mission. 
DEVELOPMENT 
In th i s  section, the development of the LM communications system from the 
original system concept to the configuration of the system established at the time of 
the original qualification tests is discussed. Many changes were made to the system. 
Minor changes at the subassembly level are too numerous to mention. Therefore, only 
changes of major importance at the system and ERA level a r e  discussed. 
System D eve I op m e n t 
The communications subcontractor submitted the original system proposal to the 
pr ime contractor in August 1962. The technical proposal suggested a 10-watt VHF/AM 
transmitter operating in the region of 225 to 300 megahertz through a diplexer to an 
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omnidirectional antenna. The same omnidirectional antenna also was to be used for  
the signal received from the CSM, and this signal was routed to  a single LM receiver 
through a diplexer. The anticipated nominal range was  450 nautical miles (1000 nauti- 
cal miles for emergency use). During lunar stay, another transceiver that used an 
LM voice FM/VHF transmitter with a ca r r i e r  frequency of 72.9 megahertz was pro- 
posed. The transmitter power was 2 watts, which was routed through another diplexer 
to an omnidirectional antenna. The link was proposed for  EV use only and had an ex- 
pected range of 3 miles. The EV signal was  to.be received on the LM omnidirectional 
antenna a t  a frequency of 121.5 megahertz. Voice, biomedical, and environmental data 
would be received on the FM receiver. 
The S-band section of the system consisted of two S-band PM transceivers; one Of 
the transceivers w a s  used as a standby during descent and on the lunar surface. Voice, 
telemetry, or both could be transmitted to the MSFN through a low-power exciter and a 
2-foot-square, gimballed, quad-helix antenna. 
an omnidirectional antenna, either of the two redundant 20-watt amplitron power ampli- 
f i e r s ,  and t h e  85-foot-diameter earth-antenna system was proposed. On the lunar s u r -  
face,  a 10-foot-diameter erectable antenna used with either power amplifier permitted 
simultaneous transmission of TV, voice, and telemetry to earth. 
Emergency-voice capability that used 
A control console accepted dual voice inputs, 32- or 16-kbps nonreturn-to-zero 
data, portable TV, closed-circuit TV, tape-recorder output, and S-band and VHF sig- 
nals. The console provided intercom capability between the crewmen in the LM. The 
outputs from the console provided voice, high- o r  low-bit-rate data, o r  TV to the 
S-band system and voice to the VHF sections. The console relayed VHF EV signals to 
the MSFN on the S-band and provided visual displays in the LM. 
By June 1963, the communications system had evolved to a concept that contained 
(1) one ERA with a VHF transceiver, an SPA with two audio centers, and a signal con- 
ditioner and (2) a second ERA containing an S-band PM transceiver, a combination 
S-band PM/FM transmitter, and a single-amplitron-tube S-band power amplifier. A 
test  program that required the second-tier vendors to supply subassemblies to the sub- 
contractor for integration and testing was developed. 
The prime contractor and subcontractor both evaluated infinite speech-clipping 
for use in V H F  operations, and the subcontractor investigated light intensifiers for  TV. 
(Television was contractor-furnished equipment a t  this time. ) 
In July 1963, engineering analyses were made of such concepts as using an S-band 
up-data link and an S-band system for  rendezvous, leaving S-band equipment and the 
VHF lunar-stay antenna on the lunar surface, increasing the gain of the steerable an- 
tenna, eliminating the erectable antenna, using w i r e  wrapping instead of soldering, and 
eliminating the transmission of taped data. For various reasons, most of the concepts 
were not accepted. 
On October 7, 1963, the subcontractor submitted a formal  technical proposal to  
the prime contractor. The contract for  the LM communications system was awarded to 
the subcontractor on February 13, 1964. A block diagram of the proposed system is 
shown in figure 12. The proposal retained the two-ERA concept and included the 
steerable-antenna electronics in the S-band ERA. The VHF omnidirectional antennas 
remained, but a VHF lunar-stay antenna was added f o r  communications with the CSM. 
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Figure 12. - Block diagram of LM communications system (subcontractor proposal of 
October 1963). 
The VHF-transmitter and VHF-receiver frequencies were changed so that voice and 
data from EV crewmen were received on 296.8 megahertz. Voice transmission was  on 
259.7 megahertz. The SPA received and processed voice, PCM and analog data from 
the LM tape recorder ,  and video from the TV camera.  
The subcontractor awarded a contract to its vendor for the infrared earth-tracker 
steerable antenna on July 6, 1964. The infrared sensor proved impractical because of 
plume effects, s t ructures  in the field of view, and the sun in the field of view; RF track- 
ing was substituted in March 1965. 
In addition to the S-band steerable antenna for inflight use, a 10-foot-diameter 
erectable antenna f o r  communications to the MSFN from the lunar surface was included. 
The S-band electronics included a P M  transceiver and a PM/FM transmitter.  
As the LM program developed, changes in the requirements for the Block I1 CSM 
interface, mission planning, reliability, and quality affected the LM communications 
system. Also, engineering analyses continued with the objective of developing a better 
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communications system. 
ization 61 (CCA-61), which contained the following significant changes and additions. 
These activities resulted in the major contract-change author- 
1. Addition of a relay capability for  CSM/LM/MSFN voice 
2. Addition of a voice-conference capability among the CSM, the LM, and the 
MSFN 
3. Addition of LM low-bit-rate PCM-transmission capability to the CSM 
4. Increase of the range requirement for  V H F  voice to a maximum of 550 nau- 
tical miles 
5. Addition of a second V H F  transmitter and receiver 
6. Addition of a third VHF low-power transmitter 
7. Addition of a VHF EVA antenna and designation of the existing V H F  omni- 
directional antennas for  inflight use only 
8. Addition of a VHF triplexer 
9. Designation of voice and telemetry to the MSFN as essential to mission 
success 
10. Addition of low-bit-rate telemetry by the S-band without the power amplifier 
for  power conservation 
11. Provision for  a preegress EV checkout 
12. Provision for  redundancy in the S-band section, including a redundant PM 
modulator and power supply and a redundant amplitron tube and power supply 
13. Modification of the emergency-voice capability from FM to PM 
14. Modification of various voice-processing circuits in the SPA 
A block diagram of the system, showing the equipment changes that resulted, is 
shown in figure 13. The two-ERA concept remained the same;  however, the s ize  of the 
packaging envelope increased as a result of adding the redundant channels (fig. 14). 
Because of the many changes that had taken place, schedules became critical. 
The need dates at the prime-contractor facility remained relatively stable, but the de- 
livery dates on the communications equipment were being extended. During a program 
review, it w a s  determined that ERA'S could be available approximately 4 months 
ear l ier  and that costs could be reduced if each vendor packaged his assembly into a 
functional ERA. Because of these program advantages, the functional ERA concept 
was adopted. 
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Figure 14, - System packaging after CCA-61. 
Using the two- ERA approach, vendors would develop functional assemblies and 
perform design-verification and qualification testing. Subassemblies then would be 
delivered to the subcontractor to be integrated into the two ERA's, The subcontractor 
then would perform development and qualification tes ts .  Flight ERA's would undergo 
acceptance tes ts  at the subcontractor facility and be delivered to the pr ime contractor 
fo r  installation on flight spacecraft. 
Under the functional ERA concept, qualification testing would be performed by 
each vendor. Then, the flight art icles would be acceptance tested and shipped directly 
to the prime contractor. The effect of this change improved program schedules in the 
test program and in the manufacture of the flight hardware. 
A s  the system design evolved, the testing philosophies and concepts changed 
accordingly. 
planning. Qualification tes ts  on the ERA's began in June 1966. 
tem design had incorporated the following significant changes. 
These changes affected equipment, manufacturing, and vendor-facilities 
By that time, the sys-  
1. The two-ERA concept was  changed to a functional ERA concept. 
2. The steerable-antenna electronics were moved onto the antenna. 
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3. The third VHF transmitter w a s  eliminated. 
-- 
4. The VHF lunar-stay antenna was eliminated. 
+ + 
t 
VHF diplexer S-band 
t 
diplexer LM 
4 .)guidance computer 
r------- S-band power 
ampli f iers (21 t VHF I Ranging- t ransmi t ter  - I tone 
A block diagram of the system at the beginning of qualification tes t s  on the ERA'S is 
shown in figure 15. 
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Figure 15. - Lunar module communications system. 
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I assembly 
E lectronic Replaceable Assembly Development 
The S-band transceiver.  - In the original conception, the S-band transceiver had 
a completely solid-state design with a phase-locked receiver, a PM transmitter, and 
an FM transmit ter .  The design made maximum use of functionally proven circuits and 
components with demonstrated reliability. Circuits and components from the CSM 
transponder were used when possible. The proposed transponder and the CSM trans- 
ponder differed principally in packaging and the primary power source (28 volts dc  on 
the LM) . Emphasis was placed on minimizing the s ize  and weight of the LM unit. The 
telemetry I 
PM and FM/PM transmitters had a 0. 75-watt output, which was  sufficient to drive the 
amplitron power amplifier to full output power. The P M  transmitter operated in a 
coherent mode and received excitation from the phase-locked receiver.  The noncoher- 
ent FM/PM transmitter was primarily for the transmission of TV and emergency voice. 
Except for  the modulators, the P M  and FM/PM transmitters were identical. 
Redundancy was provided in the functional concept by adding a coherent- 
transponder phase modulator, an additional power supply, an additional input switch, 
and an additional receiver. After the redundancy modification, the most significant 
change was that of repackaging to a pressurized ERA to eliminate a chronic corona 
problem. 
The S-band steerable antenna. - The proposed design of the steerable antenna 
used an array of six right-hand circularly polarized helical elements in a hexagonal _ -  
pattern around a central helical element. Because of vibrational problems, this design 
was  changed to the current design, which is a 26-inch-diameter parabolic dish. 
Also proposed w a s  a design for an antenna using an infrared earth tracker.  The 
design was  changed to one for an antenna using an RF tracker  to increase accuracy and 
to eliminate tracking of other infrared bodies (for example, the vehicle, the moon, or  
the sun). The RF tracking system was  reconsidered after the invention of a new feed 
system and because of the higher reliability, the wider acquisition angle fo r  a single- 
beamwidth antenna, the potential use in earth orbit, and the lower weight. 
The original-design antenna included a stow-latch mechanism, which consisted of 
a pin in the main-gear assembly that was to be removed during flight by a pyrotechnic 
device. After the restriction of the use of pyrotechnic devices, the design w a s  changed, 
and a meltable solder ring was used in conjunction with a spring-loaded pin in the gear  
assembly. 
The S-band power amplifier. - The S-band power amplifier was  a package that in- 
corporated a QKS 997A amplitron tube, a solid-state dc-to-dc converter, and associ- 
ated RF circuitry (such as circulators and R F  f i l ters) .  An RF  output of 20 watts w a s  
expected, with a total dc input of 52 watts, Control circuitry was incorporated as a 
part  of the dc-to-dc converter. Reliability was ensured by the use of components that 
were carefully selected and screened and by the use of conservative circuit and thermal 
designs. The amplitron tube was  chosen because of the following characterist ics.  
1. High efficiency (requiring l e s s  dc power and cooling) 
2. Ruggedness 
3.  Simplicity 
4. The RF feedthrough when the tube was turned off (thus allowing control of the 
tube by dc  switching to the power supply and eliminating RF  switching) 
5. Redundancy (which retained the fail-safe condition of RF  feedthrough with both 
tubes off and which could be obtained by using two tubes ia ser ies)  
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The amplitron tube was developed for the JPL .  It was expected that, by late 1963, 
a fully space-qualified tube would be available. Vibrational problems were encountered 
with the original amplitron tube (QKS 997), and development of the QKS 1300 began. 
However, early amplitrons of this type exhibited unstable operating characterist ics and 
very limited life. Some of these problems were isolated in the power-supply control 
circuitry and in the cathode-mount design. In 1965, a product-improvement program 
began; the program included a quality-control audit to determine whether materials, 
processes,  and techniques were consistent with good manufacturing practices and LM 
requirements. Failures then could be traced to the design rather  than to inconsistent 
manufacturing procedures. Four subsequent design changes and s t r ic t  quality control 
improved amplitron performance. Redundancy was included in the subassembly with 
the addition of a second amplitron, a power supply, and the required controls. Sub- 
sequently, the most significant change was the pressurization of the ERA to eliminate 
a chronic corona problem. 
The DUA. - The DUA was developed from the DCA described in the section entitled 
"System Design and Analysis." The DCA demodulator and decoder were combined with 
a 70-kilohertz discriminator to form the DUA-data section. An audio amplifier and 
associated circuitry also were added to accommodate up-link voice on the 70-kilohertz 
subcarr ier .  The DUA received signals from the output of the existing S-band 
transceiver.  
The PCMTEA. - The PCMTEA was  redesigned in 1966 as a result of the LM 
weight-reduction program. A 35-percent reduction in channel capacity resulted in re -  
duction of the system weight from 35 to 23 pounds. Power requirements were reduced 
f rom 15 to 11 watts, and the overall package length was reduced f rom 31.7 to 20.6 inches. 
Other changes that occurred during this redesign included a change from pigtail 
to face  - mounted connect o r  s , elimination of an el  e c t rom e c hanical elapsed -time indica - 
tor ,  provision for external power for  the ground-support-equipment ( B E )  buffer- 
signal outputs, and elimination of a redundant power supply for the system-timing 
circuits.  
The VHF transceiver. - The most significant design features of the LM VHF trans-  
ceiver were i t s  small  s ize  and low power consumption. Two design techniques were 
used to incorporate the design requirements and still have a lightweight, efficient unit. 
One of these was to provide audio-input clipping of approximately 40 decibels. This was 
changed to 20 decibels to provide maximum signal audio power without loss of intelligi- 
bility. Secondly, the ca r r i e r  was modulated by keying the transmitter on and off at the 
audio rate, a technique which allowed the use of t ransis tors  (with an efficiency of 
approximately 85 percent) in the RF  power output stages. Heavy modulation and power- 
amplifier t ransformers  were not required. With this modulation technique, the trans- 
mit ter  would be off during pauses between words. Therefore, a noise-suppression 
oscillator (operating above the audio range at 30 kilohertz) was added to keep the trans- 
mit ter  on during word pauses;  this feature stabilized the automatic gain control (AGC) 
in the CSM receiver.  The resulting system provided the efficiency required and was 
compatible with standard AM equipment. 
The SPA. - Originally, the SPA was based on the design of s imilar  equipment in 
The SPA consisted of two units: a PMP and an audio center. In mid-1964, the CSM. 
additional communications-system requirements resulted in the addition of the 
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following: a VHF-receive channel and two additional VHF-transmit channels in the 
audio center, band-pass f i l ters  to separate EV-crewman voice and data, four individual 
volume controls (one for each received signal in the audio center), a transmit/receive 
control, and voice-operated-keying (VOX) circuits f o r  the additional VHF equipment. 
In December 1964, the hardwire intercom between the LM and the CSM was removed, 
and the load impedances of the P M  mixing and emergency-key circuits were revised to 
make the circuits compatible with the S-band equipment. 
At, the end of 1964, the SPA packaging was changed when the functional ERA con- 
cept began, and both the PMP and the audio center functions were combined into a 
single assembly constructed from five major subassemblies. Other changes that re -  
sulted from breadboard testing at the second-tier vendor's facility and from updating 
of interface requirements were the substitution of a dc-to-dc converter for three 
smaller  individual power supplies, the addition of EM1 fil ters,  the deletion of the TV 
signal, the deletion of one VHF-transmit channel, a change in the PM- and the FM- 
output levels, the potting of a fi l ter  to prevent shorting, the addition of 6-dB/octave 
preemphasis to the EV-data channel, and the elimination of potential single-point 
failures . 
During qualification tests,  the SPA case developed a crack during vibration. The 
problem was resolved with wraparound braces  riveted to each corner of the box. Other 
failures that occurred during the initial qualification test  and the corrective actions that 
were taken were a s  follows. 
1. Distortion in the 14. 5-kilohertz-baseband P M  output required the addition of 
isolation in  the voice-biomedical amplifier-mixer. 
2.  The headset-amplifier output for both channels of the audio center w a s  out of 
tolerance and required a gain change. 
3. The 1.250-megahertz subcarr ier  w a s  out of tolerance during temperature 
tes t s  and required the addition of temperature compensation. 
4. The sidetone output was out of tolerance and required a resis tor  change. 
Other qualification-test failures were related primarily to manufacturing or. testing 
e r r o r s  and component quality-control problems that were resolved for the subsequent 
product ion units . 
TEST PROGRAM 
The Apollo test program was extensive. The objectives were to corroborate and 
demonstate all design and reliability parameters  in accordance with the specified opera- 
tional requirements. The objectives were accomplished by using the resul ts  of the 
many test phases from component tes ts  through vendor,. contractor, and launch-facility 
tes ts  to the flight tests.  The various test  methods and test  programs that were used in 
the development of the system a r e  described in the following paragraphs. 
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Test Philosophy and System Tests 
The LM testing program involved testing from the level of a component par t  to 
testing of the entire vehicle. The tes t s  were accomplished in many phases and included 
the following basic types. 
1. Developmental 
2. Qualification 
3.  Acceptance 
4. Ground vehicle 
5. System compatibility 
6. Flight vehicle 
The testing was extensive at  all levels. The program initially involved bread- 
board models and breadboard tes t s  at  the second-tier vendors ' facilities followed by the 
building and supplying of experimental models that were integrated into the two ERA's 
a t  the subcontractor's facilities. Service test models were produced for environmental 
testing at  the second-tier vendors' facilities. Then, the models were shipped to the 
subcontractor for integration and further environmental testing. The environmental 
test was the design-verification test (DVT) . Whereas other systems retained DVT at 
the second-tier vendors' facilities, in communications, DVT related to the subcontrac- 
tor  system-integration tests (eventually dropped after prototype integration). The 
DFT ' s  (which, fo r  communications, meant testing at  the second-tier vendor's facility) 
were retained with the rigor of the DVT program. In this context, DFT for communi- 
cations is synonymous with DVT on other subsystem test  programs. 
Prototype models were developed for the reliability-assurance tes t s  (RAT 's) that 
were to be followed by a twofold qualification-test program. The RAT program was 
designed to determine the probability of failure, to provide information f o r  failure- 
effects analysis, and to provide backup information for reliability assessment. Even- 
tually, the program was found to be too extensive. Also, the program became 
nonapplicable because the subcontractor no longer integrated flight equipment. 
In the latter part  of 1964, program changes that generally reflected the final test  
effort  were implemented. In addition to the overall program change from the two ERA's 
to the functional ERA concept, many tes t s  (such as sand and dust, salt-fog, fungus, and 
explosion tests)  were largely eliminated. Breadboard tes t s  and developmental tes ts  
were Consolidated into the DFT at the second-tier vendors' facilities; therefore, no 
breadboard or experimental models were delivered to the subcontractor. The DFT pro- 
gram then included, in the following order ,  an operational, a nonoperational vibration, 
an operational, an operational vibration, a thermal vacuum, a shock, an operational, 
an EMI, a voltage overstress ,  a thermal vacuum overstress ,  and a vibration overstress  
test .  
Continuing program changes resulted in further test-program modification. The 
subcontractor test-integration effort was defined; and, eventually, preproduction unit 1 
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(PP-1) and PP-2 tests were reduced in scope and then deleted because the hardware 
did not reflect the functional ERA concept. The PP-4 and PP-6 integration tes t s  were 
retained, but they were reduced in scope. The integration tes t s  were terminated before 
the production-equipment tests.  Even so, the preproduction integration tes t s  provided 
valuable system-performance information. The analyses of the integration effort were 
useful, especially the interface analysis. The ambient operational tes ts  of the EM1 
testing were valuable because the results of these tes ts  were used for  system analyses. 
In retrospect, the need for  tes ts  other than thermal or thermal vacuum tests  on a sys- 
tem basis is questionable when the results derived are compared with cost. 
In early 1968, CCA-726 imposed a high-level-vibration test  during ERA accept- 
ance to screen workmanship defects. A reevaluation was  made on each ERA to deter-  
mine whether the equipment was qualified for  the new acceptance-test levels. Although 
the original vibration levels were within the new requirements, the vibration frequencies 
(except for the PCMTEA) did not conform to the new test  levels in all cases. This 
meant that these ERA'S would have to  be requalified. However, the many design 
changes that had occurred since the original qualification had resulted in additional 
qualification-testing requirements for  each ERA (with the exception of the DUA, for  
which requirements were established after CCA-726 went into effect). Thus, the 
CCA-726 requirements and the design changes were qualified in a single delta- 
qualification program. 
shown in figure 16. 
A diagram of the qualification-test history just discussed is 
__ . 
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The tests performed after delivery of the ERA's to the pr ime contractor were as 
follows, 
1. Preinstallation tes t s  were used to check incoming equipment before installa- 
tion on the spacecraft to ensure proper operation after shipment. 
2. Vehicle system tests  were used to demonstrate the integrity of the equipment 
after installation. 
I 
3.  Vehicle integration tes ts  were used to determine the physical, functional, and 
I operational compatibility of all systems. 
4. The KSC tests ensured system and vehicle flight readiness. 
Assemblies and components procured or developed by the pr ime contractor, such 
as coaxial cables and antennas, were qualified as assemblies and integrated into the 
spacecraft at the prime-contractor facility. The Government-furnished equipment, 
such as the TV camera and the PLSS radio, were qualified at the vendor's facility and 
integrated into the spacecraft at KSC. 
The following special tes ts  were conducted as par t  of the Apollo test  program for 
communications. 
1. Extensive RF-compatibility tes ts ,  which included operational hardware, were 
performed at MSC among the LM, MSFN, CSM, and EV equipment. 
2. RF-compatibility tes t s  among the LM, MSFN, CSM, and EV equipment were 
performed on LM-4 at prime-contractor facilities using simulated MSFN, CSM, and 
EV equipment. 
3. Special system tes t s  were performed at MSC. The tes ts  included compati- 
bility tes t s  between ERA's and crew equipment, noise-level measurements, and com- 
patibility tes t s  between proposed hardware changes and the existing system. 
4. Antenna tes ts  - which included determination of antenna characteristics, 
patterns, and operation, and investigation of potential problems - were performed 
at MSC. 
5. Flyover tests to evaluate communications-system/MSFN compatibility were 
performed at the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center. 
G rou nd-Ve hide Tests 
The LM test art icle 1 (LTA- 1). - The LTA- 1 was an electronic-equipment- 
integration test vehicle. In addition to a preproduction communications system (with- 
out a s teerable  antenna), LTA- 1 contained the electrical and electronics packages of 
the other systems.  Electromagnetic-interference tes ts  performed on the LTA- 1 dis- 
closed no resultant interference on the communications ERA'S. 
served as a training vehicle for the test  and checkout personnel and was used to evalu- 
ate procedures  that were used on subsequent ground and flight vehicles. 
The LTA-1 also 
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The LM test art icle 3 (LTA-3). - The LTA-3 contained mass  representations of 
the communications-system ERA's. The mass  representations were instrumented s o  
that ERA vibration levels could be measured when the vehicle was subjected to launch- 
and boost-vibration inputs. The vibration levels were used to  determine the vibration- 
test  levels for acceptance tes ts  and qualification tes ts  of the ERA's. 
The LM test  art icle 8 (LTA-8). - The LTA-8 was the thermal vacuum test  vehicle. 
Following a complete factory test  program at the prime-contractor facility, the vehicle 
was delivered to MSC for  the thermal vacuum test  program that was performed in 
chamber B of the Space Environment Simulation Laboratory. 
complete communications system. 
The LTA-8 contained a 
The factory testing of LTA-8 included the following operational checkout proce- 
dures (OCP's) : OCP-38026 and OCP-38027, VHF and S-band voltage/standing-wave 
ratio and insert ion-loss measurements ; OCP- 38036, S- band s t  eerable -ant enna verif i- 
cation; OCP- 38037, communications -system functional verification; OCP- 6 10 15, final 
engineering acceptance test/electromagnetic-compatibility systems verification, plugs 
in; and OCP-61018, final engineering acceptance test/electromagnetic-compatibility 
systems verification, plugs out. 
Several difficulties were encountered with LTA-8, and OCP-61018 was performed 
twice before the system was accepted and shipped to MSC. None of the problems that 
necessitated the retest  were attributed to the communications system. 
The MSC testing included OCP-B-38029, OCP-B-90000, OCP-B-90001, and 
OCP-B-90002. The communications-system verification test  (OCP-B-38029) was per-  
formed satisfactorily, and the communications-link verifications (on the VHF and 
S-band) were within the prescribed tolerances. 
delayed test completion. 
The following two major problem areas 
1. The LM steerable-antenna slew test  delayed completion of OCP-B-38029 for  
1 week because of errat ic  operation of the steerable antenna. The trouble was isolated 
in the panel 12 pitch-and-yaw control knobs, which were improperly alined on the con- 
t rol  shaft. 
2. More than 110 procedural deviations occurred during the test .  Most of the 
deviations were attributed to incorrect switching sequences. 
Manned-rating test  OCP-B-90000 revealed the only major communications prob- 
lems encountered during the manned-rating tes ts :  the S-band down link could not be 
acquired at the communications test  station when the tes t  chamber was at  a pressure 
of less than 2 X 
further communications tes ts  were conducted at that pressure.  However, the prime 
contractor reran the manned-rating tes ts  a t  ambient conditions and could not re-create 
this problem. Subsequent investigation indicated that corona caused the anomaly. How- 
ever, the transducer monitors inside the S-band power amplifiers and transceivers 
gave no indication of a corona problem. The S-band power amplifier was replaced, and 
the problem did not recur i n  subsequent vacuum tests .  
psia. Because of the fatigued condition of the astronauts, no 
The thermal vacuum tests  (OCP-B-90001 and OCP-B-90002) revealed only a 
steerable-antenna slew problem that appeared when the steerable antenna was subjected 
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to a brief manual-slew test  (five positions in pitch and yaw). The crew reported that 
the antenna did not respond properly to the pitch-and-yaw control knobs. After ice was 
found throughout the chamber and on the antenna, the pr ime contractor reported that 
the anomaly was caused by gimbal freezeups. However, failure investigation at  the 
second-tier vendor facilities revealed that an unsoldered transistor caused the prob- 
lem. Two other thermal vacuum tests  were run on LTA-8; however, the communica- 
tions system was used only as a heat load. 
Lunar module 2. - System tes t s  and integrated tes ts  were conducted on LM-2, 
which was  used as backup for the Apollo 5/LM-1 mission, at the pr ime contractor facil- 
ities. The factory tes ts  were the same as those previously listed for LTA-8. After 
acceptance at  the phase 111 customer-acceptance readiness review and the successful 
launch of Apollo 5, LM-2 was shipped to Houston for  ground testing. 
: 
I 
In late 1968, the decision was made to use LM-2 as a lunar-landing drop-test 
vehicle. The two major objectives of the simulated-lunar-landing drop test  were to 
demonstrate that the operational systems functioned successfully during a simulated 
lunar landing and to demonstrate that the systems required for a launch from the lunar 
surface and rendezvous with the CSM could operate successfully after a simulated lunar 
landing. The communications-system testing verified the ability of the system to main- 
tain phase lock of the S-band system using the steerable antenna throughout lunar- 
landing impact. No equipment problems were encountered. 
Fl ight-Vehic le Tests 
The previously described factory test  program used on the LTA vehicles was used 
fo r  LM- 1, LM-3, and LM-4. During system functional verification, difficulties were 
experienced because of interference caused by simultaneous testing of other systems. 
Conflicts were encountered continually in cooling requirements and PCM-bit-rate re- 
quirements. The conflicts contributed to the test-flow changes that were initiated for  
LM-5. The insertion losses and voltage/standing-wave ratios for  LM-5 were measured 
during vehicle construction. The system verification was performed in OCP-62000- 
COMM (the communications section of the combined system preacceptance test  f o r  the 
vehicle). This  verification and the test  procedures for  all systems were performed 
with a control procedure that eliminated many system conflicts. 
During the testing of these vehicles, the greatest  concerns were the availability 
of flight hardwarefor  testing and the condition of the communications test  station (CTS). 
The vehicles were tested during a period when many modifications were taking place in 
the ERA'S (for example, pressurization of the S-band transceiver and power amplifier, 
voice-improvement changes in the SPA, addition of VHF ranging, and steerable-antenna 
modifications). As a result, many OCP's and final engineering acceptance tes t s  were 
performed with interim equipment; the installation and checkout of the flight equipment 
were done at KSC. Many test discrepancies were attributed to the CTS. The number of 
discrepancies w a s  lowered by the improved calibration procedure, which was partially 
employed for LM-5, and by the addition of a third CTS (shipped from MSC after the 
LTA-8 tests), which reduced the loading of the other two units. 
Lunar module 1. - The testing methods used on LM-1 at KSC were derived basical- 
l y  f rom the prime-contractor ground-operations requirements plan (GORP) and consisted 
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of tes t s  that were very s imilar  to those performed at the prime-contractor facility. The 
test procedures were modified to include interface and compatibility testing with the 
Merrit t  Island launch a rea  ground station. The LM-1 also served as the training vehi- 
cle for KSC test  personnel. 
Lunar module 3. - The GORP w a s  eliminated for LM-3 testing, and an expanded 
test  and checkout requirements document (TCRD) was developed from the prime- 
contractor TCRD; the expanded TCRD included interface testing with the MSFN, the 
CSM, and the PLSS. The test-specification and cr i ter ia  document was used in conjunc- 
tion with the TCRD to establish the test  requirements in greater  detail and to establish 
the specifications and tolerances of the test  measurements. The following major test  
procedures and problems were associated with LM-3. 
1. TCP-KL-0010. Resistors used to form an EM1 fil ter in the ground-return 
line of the VHF transceivers were found defective as a result of a GSE-interface prob- 
lem at the subcontractor's facility. The unit was returned to the subcontractor f o r  
removal of the fi l ter ,  which was  added to the vehicle wiring. 
2. TCP-KL-0013. Communications problems that arose during the altitude- 
chamber test were not attributed to the spacecraft system. 
3. TCP-KL-0033. The combined-systems test at  the Vehicle Assembly Building 
was completed with no significant anomalies encountered in the communications equip- 
ment. Frequency clearance was restricted by the Apollo 8 (CSM-103) simulated- 
mission-countdown-demonstration test. The LM-3 communications system passed all 
test sequences. During the up-link/down-link combinations-mode checks, S-band and 
VHF voice intelligibility was satisfactory in all cases. I 
4. TCP-KL-0005. During the flight-readiness test ,  both the VHF and the S-band 
systems performed satisfactorily. The reception of PLSS voice and data relayed 
through the LM and the MSFN station at  KSC was extremely good at  the Mission Control 
Center, Houston, Texas. As expected, baseband voice caused PCM bit e r r o r s  that 
affected both high- and low-bit-rate telemetry. 
5. TCP-KL-0007. The communication sequences of the countdown-demonstration 
test  were conducted successfully with no discrepancy reports  against the LM communi- 
cations system. 
Lunar module 4. - The tes ts  for  LM-4 were modified to reduce the number of tes t s  
performed before the altitude-chamber test .  The following test  procedures and prob- 
lems were associated with LM- 4. 
1. TCP-KL-0039. The communication sequences of the system functional test 
were conducted successfully. A special test  procedure (number 86), which provided a 
complete retest of the VHF transceiver after ranging modification, was  conducted suc- 
cessfully. The system functional test  w a s  not intended to simulate the LM-4 mission. 
For instance, strong up-link and down-link signal levels were used, and only one LM 
down-link mode w a s  verified. However, the tes t  was designed to verify that all systems 
were in the proper operational condition and t o  detect any degradation caused by vehicle 
shipment from the prime contractor and subsequent installation at  KSC. The LM-4 com- 
munications equipment operated satisfactorily. 
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2. TCP-KL-0013. The altitude-chamber tes t s  consisted of an unmanned run, a 
first manned run, and a second manned run. Simulated missions were conducted to de- 
termine vehicle safety and system capability in  a high-altitude environment. During 
the first manned run, the test  was aborted because of problems in the environmental- 
control system. However, the communications system performed normally during the 
test. i 
3. TCP-KL-0033. The communications sequences of the combined-systems test  
were conducted successfully. No discrepancies were found in the LM communications 
system. 
t 
Lunar module 5. - The tes ts  for LM-5 followed the same general guidelines as I i 
E 
5 
those for  LM-4. However, t es t s  were performed on the erectable antenna, which was 
not used on LM-4. The following major test  procedures and problems were associated 
with LM-5. - 
1. TCP-KL-0039. Interim discrepancy report  12 was prepared when the un- 
locked AGC voltage was  measured at  0. 53 volt. (The test  limit is a maximum of 
0.50 volt.) The secondary-transceiver unlocked AGC voltage was measured at 0.61 volt. 
Later,  the information in the interim discrepancy report  was  transferred to vehicle 
discrepancy report  123, which was prepared against the transceiver. Tests  on both 
pr imary and secondary transceivers indicated normal AGC curves in the phase-locked 
condition. After additional tes ts  on the signal-to-noise ratio and the antenna AGC 
showed that the phase-locked primary transceiver was normal, the discrepancy report 
w a s  closed. No interim discrepancy reports  were prepared during VHF test  sequences. 
2. TCP-KL-0013. The unmanned test  was completed without difficulties. The 
first manned test  with the backup crew was aborted because of problems with the water 
boiler. However, the LM pilot had noticed audio feedthrough in the intercom tes t s  before 
cessation of the test. The first manned test  was rerun, and the commander commented 
that minor feedthrough during the intercom-system test  presented no difficulties. Dur- 
ing the second manned run (with the prime crew), minor feedthrough again presented no 
difficulties to  the crew. 
completely inhibit the audio signals. The problem was corrected on all units except the 
unit on LM-5. 
The audio feedthrough was caused by SPA diodes that did not 
The second manned run was repeated because of the water-boiler problem en- 
countered in the f i r s t  run. Interim discrepancy report  39 was prepared when the LM 
pilot's umbilical push-to-talk switch did not function normally. The attitude-control 
push-to-talk switch then was used, and its operation was  normal. 
cal push-to-talk switch problem could not be repeated during tes t s  made after repres-  
surization, the umbilical subsequently was replaced. 
Although the umbili- 
3. TCP-KL-0033 and TCP-KL- 1222. The combined-systems and CSM/LM 
interface t e s t s  were combined because of scheduling difficulties imposed by additional 
work required on the water-glycol system and the CSM schedule for  TCP-KL-1222. 
TCP-KL-0033 proceeded until the communications-system checkout was adequate to 
support TCP-KL- 1222; then, TCP-KL- 1222 was performed. After completion of 
TCP-KL-1222, TCP-KL-0033 was completed. 
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During TCP-KL- 1222, interim discrepancy report 3 was prepared because voice 
transmission interfered with VHF ranging acquisition. 
permitted voice to enter the VHF ranging channel. 
The SPA feedthrough diodes had 
4. TCP-KL-0005. The VHF and S-band equipment was tested during communica- 
tions turn-on in the flight-readiness test. The PLSS was tested by verifying communica- 
tions between EVCS-1 and EVCS-2 and by demonstrating dual EVCS communications to  
the LM. After the PLSS tests,  all communication points (LM, CSM, EVCS-1, EVCS-2, 
and MSFN) were actuated, and successful transmissions were performed on all channels. 
Television reception was  tested with down-link simulation of the received signal strength. 
The las t  test sequence was a VHF ranging test  that simulated different LM to CSM dis- 
tances. The mission-simulation portion of TCP-KL-0005 was accomplished with good 
results. 
5. TCP-KL-0007. Three problems were encountered during the communications 
sequences of the countdown-demonstration test .  One problem involved the commander's 
umbilical cable, and the other two problems involved the S-band steerable antenna. 
During the calibration of the antenna control knobs, difficulties developed with the set-  
screws; the setscrews were replaced, and the knobs were calibrated. Also, following 
arming of the antenna, the access door to the electronics package was  damaged. 
electronics package subsequently was repaired and reinstalled. 
The 
SYSTEM RELl AB I LlTY AND PERFORMANCE 
The basic approach toward the attainment of the reliability goals was to optimize 
the basic design by determining possible failure modes or  sources in the design and by 
correcting or eliminating potential sources of failure. 
cluded planning and implementing a comprehensive reliability program plan; reliability 
training and indoctrination; design reviews; par t s  selection; application and control; re- 
liability apportionment and estimates; configuration analyses ; failure-mode-prediction 
analyses; circuit- and failure-effect analyses; maintainability analyses; and failure 
reporting and analyses. 
The major considerations in- 
The quality program was guided by NASA Quality Assurance Publication NPC 
200-2 entitled "Quality Program Provisions for  Space System Contractors," which re- 
quired that material, component, and part  suppliers follow the guidelines of NPC 200-3 
entitled "Inspection System Provisions for  Suppliers of Space Materials, Pa r t s ,  Com- 
ponents, and Services ." The quality-assurance provisions of NPC 200-2 were demand- 
ing ang detailed. The provisions emphasized an organized approach to quality assurance 
thYough all phases of contract performance, including preliminary-engineering design, 
development, fabrication, processing, assembly, inspection, tes t ,  checkout, packaging, 
shipping, storage, maintenance, field use, flight preparations, flight operations, and 
flight analysis. The quality-program system provided for prompt detection of def i- 
ciencies; system incompatibilities, marginal quality, and trends or  conditions that 
could result in unsatisfactory quality. 
determination of quality characteristics, documentation, traceability, material pur- 
chase, fabrication control, and corrective action. 
Considerable emphasis was placed on planning, 
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As a general indication of performance during the development of the communica- 
tions system, the number of failures for  each ERA is shown in table IV. Failures de- 
creased from a maximum during acceptance tes ts  to a minimum during vehicle tests.  
The value of the reliability and quality assurance has been demonstrated by the absence 
of any equipment failures during the operational flights. 
TABLE IV. - FAILURE SUMMARY FOR MAJOR SECTIONS OF THE 
LM COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM 
Section 
S-band transceiver 
S-band power 
amplifier 
S-band steerable 
antenna 
Signal-processor 
assembly 
VHF transceiver 
Digital up-link 
assembly 
PCMTEA 
aal i f icat ion 
15 
17 
11 
36 
25 
0 
92 
Number of test  failures 
Development 
verification 
0 
1 
0 
13 
4 
0 
10 
4c c ep t anc e 
74 
186 
112 
127 
68 
10 
53 
Pr einstallation 
5 
1 4  
0 
2 
5 
0 
0 
Vehicle 
S I GN I FI CANT MOD I F I CAT1 ONS AND PROBLEMS 
Modifications and problems that occurred in the LM communications system after 
the original qualification tests a r e  discussed in this section. 
Steerable Antenna  
Antenna coverage, CCA-726, and structural cracks. - A change in program re -  
quirements to increase the steerable-antenna coverage resulted in a major redesign. 
The mounting configuration on the LM was modified, the electronics box was rotated, 
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the gimbal limits in the yaw axis were increased, and the servosystem-loop gain was 
increased. These design changes necessitated requalification of the antenna. Shortly 
before the requalification program was scheduled to begin, CCA-726 was issued, and 
the vibration-test levels were increased. During requalification, structural failures 
occurred in the antenna-electronics-package mounting. The cracks, which were con- 
cealed by thermal paint, were not discovered until several antennas had been delivered 
to the prime contractor. As a result of the failures, new housings were designed for  
antennas in production, and antennas that had been installed were retrofitted on the 
vehicle with fiber-glass and epoxy braces. 
"Mule" failures. - During requalification tes ts ,  a failure occurred in one of the 
antenna "mules" (a two-layered printed-circuit board). This mule was replaced; how- 
ever, a second mule failure occurred. Mule failures occurred on other antennas at 
both the manufacturer and prime-contractor facilities. Investigation revealed that the 
failures resulted from thermal or structural stresses (or both) occurring between 
solder joints and potting material. Electronics packages were built with improved tech- I 
niques fo r  assembling, soldering, and potting; improved inspection; and improved han- 
dling procedures. Mission-simulation tes ts  were performed to verify that the new units 
were flightworthy. 
Intermodulation products. - During testing of an early production antenna at MSC, 
intermodulation products on the S-band up-link signal, which was used to position the 
steerable antenna, caused severe tracking e r r o r s  that could have made tracking impos- 
sible under normal mission conditions. Extensive tes t s  at MSC revealed that the inter- 
modulation products could be reduced to an acceptable level by reducing the modulation 
indices on certain up-link modes without seriously altering the up-link quality. 
modulation indices were changed at  all ground stations before the f i r s t  steerable antenna 
was flown. 
The 
Integrated circuits. - A failure that occurred in the steerable antenna during 
second-tier vendor testing was attributed to a pA702 integrated circuit. During the 
failure analysis, an internal aluminurn leadwire that had opened because of corrosion 
was located. Further tes ts  and analyses indicated that the problem was limited to the 
integrated circuits in glass flatpacks with aluminum internal leads (pA702 and pA710). 
The following two failure mechanisms were occurring. 
1. Aqueous corrosion was caused by contaminant on the wires and moisture that 
either was entering the package through a leak o r  was being sealed within the package. 
Further analysis indicated that the sealing of moisture within the package was 
improbable. 
2. Glass-splattering that occurred when the glass-to-metal seal was made ac- 
counted for the contamination seen in some of the integrated circuits. This reaction 
between the glass and the aluminum inside the integrated circuit occurred with no addi- 
tional outside factors. These failures began with integrated circuits bonded after 
March 22, 1967, and continued through final manufacture of that type of circuit in 1969. 
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Because of the extensive use of the pA702 integrated circuit throughout the LM, 
an ad hoc team was  established to make a comprehensive review of pertinent data. 
This team made the following determinations. 
--
1. Twelve corrosion-induced failures occurred in the vendor's stock of 2246 
integrated circuits, which had an average shelf life of 0 .8  year. The failure ra te  was  
0.75 failure/million hours. 
2. Of the 421 integrated circuits (installed in the LM), which had an average age 
of 1.6 years, no corrosion-induced failures occurred. One failure w a s  assumed, and 
the resultant failure ra te  was 0. 17 failure/million hours. The installed integrated cir-  
cuits had a lower failure ra te  because they were protected from handling and were con- 
formal coated or potted; thus, a moisture bar r ie r  was  provided. 
vendor had been subjected to environments designed to accelerate the failure ra te  and 
had received additional handling during tests.  
The circuits at the 
Based on this information, the failure rate for  assembled hardware was designa- 
ted as h = 0. 17 failure/million hours. This failure ra te  was acceptable for  par t s  of 
this type. 
These data were presented to the MSC Configuration Control Board (CCB) on 
December 12, 1969, and the assembled hardware w a s  declared flightworthy. 
The ad hoc team assessed the possibility of increasing the reliability of unassem- --
bled spacecraft hardware (for example, the S-band steerable antenna and other vendor 
spare  parts) .  The team concluded that a screening process could be developed for  
the 3H glass flatpacks. The screening process consisted of environmental exposures 
(thermal cycling and mechanical shock) and a leak test  after lead processing. The 
possibility of using a different integrated circuit a lso was investigated. This investi- 
gation led to consideration of the 3F integrated circuit. The same internal par ts  were 
used, but the circuit was  encased in a ceramic package that had an inherently better 
hermetic seal .  The 3H integrated circuits were retained on the basis of good field ex- 
perience, confidence in the screening processes, and lack of comparable experience 
with the 3F device. However, the 3F integrated circuit was  developed as a backup. 
For increased reliability, unassembled hardware was built with screened 3H integrated 
circuits. 
Wire wrap-ups. - W i r e  wrap-ups were used instead of rotary joints to transfer 
the control- and power-circuit inputs and outputs across  the antenna axes of rotation. 
During ear ly  production, a number of electrical short  circuits developed in the wrap- 
ups because of minute metal filings embedded in the surface of the wrap-ups. Stringent 
quality control and inspection during the fabrication and assembly processes eliminated 
the problem. In 1968, a second wrap-up problem occurred during acceptance testing of 
flight antennas because of procedures f o r  gimbal assembly that allowed incorrect instal- 
lation of the wrap-ups. The antennas at the prime contractor and KSC were cycle 
tested in an attempt to induce failures in antennas with incorrectly installed wrap-ups; 
one antenna was found to have this problem. The assembly procedure was corrected 
for  the remainder of the antennas in production. 
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Stow position. - An error.during production resulted in two antennas with an incor- , rect  stow position in the Y-axis. However, because of schedule problems, the antennas 
were used with the incorrect stow position (based on the satisfactory resul ts  of a ther- 
mal analysis). 
Heat shield. - The antenna vendor had production delays because of low heat- 
shield yield during early production. The delays resulted from the tight tolerances re- 
quired and the learning process at the heat-shield vendor. Also, a design change was 
required because of heat-shield binding on the antenna support boom when the antenna 
was installed on the vehicle. The problem was  solved by increasing the heat-shield 
diameter . 
Circuit breaker and loss of up link. - As a resu l t  of the increased-coverage design 
change, current limiting was removed from the drive motors to provide increased capa- 
bility. During vehicle testing on LM-4, the antenna tracked an RF signal into the an- 
tenna gimbal stops. The dc circuit breaker opened when the condition occurred because 
the motors drew maximum current in an attempt to continue tracking. Also, if up-link 
lock was lost, the antenna slewed to the stops. (See the section entitled "S-Band Trans- 
ceiver" for a discussion of this problem.) The breaker did not open; but current,  which 
could overheat the motors, was drawn. These problems were corrected with opera- 
tional procedure changes; if the antenna tracked into the stops and opened the breaker 
or  if up-link lock was lost and the antenna slewed into the stops, the normal signal was 
reacquired or the antenna was turned off. 
Manual signal acquisition. - An analysis was  performed on the tolerance buildup 
that would affect manual acquisition. Several factors had large tolerances that could 
prevent manual signal acquisition if the tolerances added unfavorably. The knobs lo- 
cated on panel 12 in the LM were calibrated to reduce the tolerances. The calibration 
was performed with the antenna stowed and the drive motors nulled (which was verified 
audibly by the use of a stethoscope). The knobs then were set to the stowed positions 
indicated on the panel. During calibration, the knobs had a tendency to slip on the 
synchroshafts. 
provided added strength on the threaded surfaces.  
Each knob was modified to use two setscrews and helicoil inser ts  that 
Antenna blockage. - Because of the difficulties encountered on LM-5 in establish- 
ing automatic tracking, an investigation of the RF blockage diagrams used for preflight 
predictions was conducted. The results of the investigation indicated that, following 
the increased-coverage design change, a blockage diagram in use did not show several  
a r eas  where blockage occurred, The diagram was revised in all affected documents. 
Heater checkout. - The antenna required cooling below the thermostat-trip level 
(-40" F) to turn on the internal heaters,  During checkout of the antenna on the vehicle, 
proper operation of the electronics-box heaters  could not be verified. The integrity of 
the copper path was verified by applying voltage to the heater inputs. For LM-5 and 
subsequent vehicles, the internal temperature of the electronics box was  telemetered 
to the ground for  real-time monitoring. 
S-Band Power Amplifier 
The S-band power amplifier had many corona problems. Seventeen corona fail- 
ures  of the power amplifiers occurred between July 15 and September 12, 1967. There 
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were four  types of corona: ac  corona, which could be recognized by a visible glow, was 
experienced on all units tested; RF corona, which was indicated by a sharp loss  of out- 
put power with no change in input current;  dc  arc  in the high-voltage module near the 
power connector, which was indicated by a loss of output power and probable loss  of in- 
put current;  and dc  a r c  in the potted high-voltage power supply, which was indicated by 
a decrease in output power and input current. All  the corona types occurred at critical 
pressure,  but the ac  and RF coronas were self-extinguishing. The other corona types 
in the high-voltage module were destructive. 
The ac corona resulted from an ac field outside the potted high-voltage module. 
To bring a ground plane against the potting, a grounded 2-mil-thick nickel s t r ip  was 
welded against the potted module, and an epoxy overcoat was applied. This modifica- 
tion prevented the ac  field f rom penetrating into the airspace outside the module. 
To eliminate the RF corona that occurred in the output isolator, the distance be- 
tween two vanes within the isolator was widened. The unit subsequently was tested 
with 30 watts of input power (normal is approximately 1 watt) and operated properly. 
One of the dc  a rcs ,  which was caused by current leakage from cracks in the pot- 
ting, was isolated to the high-voltage leads at  the connector. The problem was  cor- 
rected by removing the potting, applying a primer,  and repotting. The pr imer  helped 
the plotting adhere to the mold and solder joint. 
The other dc  a r c  in the high-voltage power supply resulted from cracks and voids 
in the potting that allowed arcing to ground. The outside walls of the module were 
coated with epoxy, which was intended to prevent air molecule transfer.  
Because of the short  time allowed for the corrective actions that were taken, dis-  
crete  engineering analyses to determine the actual cause and location of the corona 
were not possible. For example, the many problems that developed during testing of 
the epoxy coat resulted in an extensive redesign of the heat sink for the high-voltage 
power supply and in corona screening of all components. In September 1968, a post- 
qualification review was performed, and corona anomalies were noted in the test  re -  
sults.  The failures were a result of corona breakdown in the amplitron-tube potting. 
On November 18, 1968, the CCB requested special corona tes ts  on amplitron 
tubes and S-band power amplifiers. The tests analyzed corona conditions that resulted 
f rom possible potting voids in the amplitron tubes. In January 1969, as a result  of the 
tests, the CCB authorized pressurization of the power amplifier as the most reliable 
method of eliminating corona. 
Two measurement points in the power amplifier, the forward-power output and 
the reflected-power output, were never accurate; and the forward-power output was 
used only to indicate high power or low power. Because of space restrictions in the 
pressurized case, the measurement points were deleted. 
S -  Band Transceiver 
Corona and pressurization. - In September and October 1967, four failures 
occurred in the S-band transceiver because of corona in the RF multiplier chain. The 
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prime contractor recommended that the multiplier chain be foamed and that the circuits 
be sealed with combinations of epoxy and foam and an overcoating of 0.004-inch alumi- 
num foil. Long-term thermal vacuum tests were performed to evaluate effects of 
temperature, vacuum, and humidity on the sealing materials. The tes ts  provided 
information on the leak rate  and time-to-failure fo r  this type of seal. 
The delta-qualification test  of the seal began in May 1968. On May 18 and 19, 
1968, a corona failure occurred in both transceiver channels. On May 29, 1968, 
this problem was presented to management, and it was decided that the S-band trans- 
ceiver case would be pressurized for  LM-3 and subsequent lunar modules. 
Noisy AGC tracking signal. - During a steerable-antenna test  on LM-4 when up- 
link lock was lost, the steerable antenna drove into the gimbal stops. This problem 
was caused by the AGC circuit in the transceiver going to full gain and amplifying noise 
that was routed to the steerable-antenna tracking-circuit input. To correct the prob- 
lem, a level detector that would disable the AGC tracking signals a t  loss  of signal was 
needed. However, because of cost and schedule impacts, the modification was not 
made; and the existing system was used after introducing a procedural change that pre- 
vented overheating of the servodrive electronics. 
Telemetry-point noise. - During the flight of LM- 1, the telemetered measurement 
of transmitter output power varied considerably. The cause of the apparent power 
variation was noise at the telemetry measurement point. On subsequent missions, a 
f i l ter  added to the measurement point eliminated the problem. 
Control of PM/FM. - It was discovered during system testing that the transceiver 
reverted to the PM mode from the FM mode when power to the control circuits was in- 
terrupted. The assembly remained in the PM mode until the modulate switch was r e -  
cycled through "PM" back to "FM." Because the automatic restoration of FM w a s  
desirable but not a mandatory requirement, no modifications were made. 
The VHF Transceiver 
The V H F  ranging. - The most significant modification to the VHF transceiver w a s  
the addition of V H F  ranging capability, a new requirement that established a backup to  
the rendezvous radar .  The ranging modification increased power-supply ripple to  the 
receiver and affected sensitivity. An additional f i l ter  capacitor was added to solve the 
problem. 
Corona. - When it w a s  determined that the aft equipment bay in the LM would be 
at  a partial pressure during flight, a corona tes t  a t  this pressure was added to the 
acceptance test. 
mitter, were experienced on some units. A Teflon ba r r i e r  was added between crit ical  
components to resolve the problem. 
Failures, in the form of low RF in the multiplier section of the trans- 
Voice-clipping level. - Compatibility testing indicated that the clipping level in the 
VHF modulator w a s  too high. The LM cabin noise was higher than anticipated, and the 
clipping reduced the signal-to-noise ratio to an  unusable level. The new clipping level 
of 20 decibels was selected as a compromise between noise reduction and maximum 
range capability. 
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The EM1 fil ter.  - A GSE-interface problem caused an EM1 fil ter in the receiver 
power return to burn out. In the first analysis, the fi l ter  w a s  considered unnecessary 
for  the vehicle frequencies present, and the filter was removed. However, later ve- 
hicle testing indicated that the fi l ter  was necessary. Because of VHF delivery sched- 
ules and the cost involved, the filter was replaced in the circuit as a box outside the 
transceiver ERA. 
Digital Up-Link Assembly 
Up-link voice. - Shortly after the DUA program began in March 1967, the DUA 
This change eliminated the was modified to provide a redundant up-link-voice path. 
single-point failure for  up-link voice in the SPA 30-kHz discriminator. The modifica- 
tion included an audio amplifier in the DUA and the required panel controls. The DUA 
voice output was fed directly into the crewmen's headsets; however, the audio level was 
not adequate. Therefore, the audio from the DUA was routed to the commander's 
microphone input and was amplified by the commander 's  audio center to a usable level. 
Integrated circuits. - A reliability notice w a s  issued to all users  of a specific type 
of integrated circuit to inform them that certain lots of this type circuit had been found 
defective. Upon investigation, it was  discovered that integrated circuits from these 
suspect lots had been used in the DUA. New integrated circuits were procured, and the 
suspect units were replaced. 
Power-off pulse.- During testing, it w a s  discovered that transient pulses appeared 
on the output lines when the DUA power was turned off. The pulses caused an "up-link- 
too-fast" PCM indication and fed erroneous information into the LGC. A procedural 
change that cleared the LGC when the DUA was turned on (either by up-link commands 
or  from the DSKY in the LM) solved the problem. 
Erectable Antenna 
Lifting bar .  - The original erectable-antenna design for  lifting the antenna package 
onto its tripod contained provisions that were based on a crewman-stoop-reach capability 
(hand above surface) of 18 inches. As backpack s ize  and weight increased, the safe 
stoop-reach capability was revised. Therefore, a rigid bar  was placed on the erectable- 
antenna package that could accommodate a stoop-reach range of 0 to 36 inches. 
Sharp r i b  tips. - The r ibs  of the antenna were made of thin (0.010 inch) aluminum 
channel. 
made the edges sharp.  The resulting danger to a crewman's suit and gloves was  alle- 
viated by coating the r ib  tip with urethane. 
The c ross  section of the r ib  tip was rectangular, and the thin wall  material  
Gear t ra in  force.  - During testing, it was discovered that the force required to 
change the gear  train f rom azimuth to elevation was greater  than a suited crewman 
could provide. The spring force w a s  decreased. 
51 
Signal-P rocessor Assembly 
Cable and connectors. - The wire bundle of the original 199-pin connector in the 
SPA was too stiff to withstand the flexing and handling that w a s  necessary during the 
life of the unit. Therefore, the original connector was replaced by two 85-pin connec- 
to rs .  
were terminated several inches from the connector. However, flexing between the 
shield-termination point and the connector caused the wires to break. The units were 
returned to the vendor for replacement of the entire pendant cable, which was then pot- 
ted to form a rigid joint between the cable and the connector. 
Most of the shielded wires were routed into one of the connectors, and the shields 
"Hot-mike" intercom. - Because of problems experienced with previous VOX com- 
munications systems, the crewmen requested that a positive hands-off intercom be 
provided. The SPA was  changed to provide continuous "hot-mike" intercom with simul- 
taneous push-to-talk capability for  VHF and S-band transmissions. 
S-band squelch. - During EV operations, the LM could relay received S-band com- 
munications to the crewmen on the lunar surface. If the up-link signal were lost, noise 
in the discriminator output would become very high. This noise would be relayed to the 
crew, and there was no way to turn if off without returning to the vehicle or turning off 
the PLSS receiver. Because neither of these methods was desirable, an S-band 
squelch was added to the SPA. This addition provided means for  detecting loss  of the 
30-kilohertz subcarrier and cutting off the S-band audio path automatically by means 
of a diode switch. 
Redundant power supply. - Original fail-safe requirements were based upon a 
short occurring at any power-supply output for  5 seconds. The requirements were 
changed to provide protection from a short of an indefinite period. Considerable rede- 
sign of the power supplies and control lines resulted. A single-point-failure study re -  
vealed that all amplifiers for received signals (S-band and VHF) were supplied power 
from one regulated power supply. To eliminate the single-point failure, a redundant 
power supply w a s  added with the supply voltage coming from a completely different 
source. 
Linear volume controls, - Because of a misunderstanding concerning the SPA/LM 
interface, the volume controls for the individual received signals were extremely non- 
linear and responded more like switches than volume controls. The problem could be 
solved either by changing the controls on the vehicle to a linear type or  by adding 16 r e -  
s i s tors  in the SPA to compensate f o r  the nonlinearity. Because of cost and schedule, 
the SPA was changed. 
Initiation of VOX AGC. - After compatibility testing at  MSC, several  problems 
with SPA design that were related to use in the LM were uncovered. During VOX opera- 
tion of the microphone amplifier, the AGC did not begin to react to the signal until after 
the VOX actuation had occurred. A s  a result ,  the amplifier output appeared with maxi- 
mum gain, which caused a pop at  the beginning of each transmission. Design was 
changed s o  that AGC began simultaneously with VOX. 
Gain reduction in hot-mike operations. - During hot-mike operation when no voice 
input existed, the microphone amplifier was a t  full gain and made the cabin noise very 
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objectionable. A design change provided for  a 12-decibel gain reduction during this mode 
of operation. By pressing the push-to-talk switch, the gain was returned to normal. 
The VHF-receive AGC amplifiers. - The VHF-receive AGC amplifiers caused 
considerable noise buildup during no-voice periods because the amplifiers operated at  
maximum gains (as in the hot-mike mode). The AGC amplifiers were replaced with 
linear amplifiers to alleviate this problem. 
Miscellaneous changes. - Other changes included separation of the keying supply 
lines and addition of a redundant ground-return line to eliminate single-point failures : 
deletion of two transient-suppression diodes to eliminate an undesired feedthrough sig- 
nal on the intercom bus; and a change to a more reliable GSE connector. 
FLIGHTS 
Apol I O  51LM- 1 
The LM- 1 communications system included all S-band and signal-processing 
equipment that was necessary to verify MSFN communications compatibility with track- 
ing and ranging data, RF up link (with simulated up voice and up data), and the trans- 
mission of PCM data. 
The operational communications system performed normally throughout the mis- 
sion. The S-band system was activated when the LM was separated from the S-IVB 
stage of the launch vehicle; reception of low-power primary-transceiver signals was 
verified. The secondary transceiver and the power amplifier were activated at 
01:34:00 ground elapsed time (g. e. t . ) ,  and the high-power mode w a s  employed through- 
out the remainder of the mission. The S-band down link consisted of the S-band ca r r i e r  
(2282.5 megahertz), PRN ranging, the turned-around up-link subcarr iers  (30 and 
70 kilohertz), and S-band PCM telemetry. The S-band PCM telemetry was used during 
the entire mission in the high-bit-rate mode (51.2 kbps). 
The S-band equipment also operated normally with respect to PRN ranging and 
tracking and up-link signals (with simulated up voice and up data). The capability of 
the turned-around up-voice channel was demonstrated by modulating the 30-kilohertz 
up-voice subcar r ie r  with a 1-kilohertz tone at selected MSFN sites.  The S-band up- 
data channel performance was demonstrated successfully when transmitting a 
70-kilohertz unmodulated signal to the spacecraft transceiver from selected sites.  
Three stations were evaluated for S-band up-data-command capability. 
No VHF equipment was flown on LM-1. 
Apol I O  91LM-3 
The LM-3 communications system performed normally during the Apollo 9 mis- 
sion. In relation to the communications system, the purpose of the mission was to 
demonstrate VHF and S-band performance readiness for the Apollo 10 lunar flight. 
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The communications system included all S-band, VHF,  and signal-processing 
equipment necessary (1) to transmit and receive voice, tracking data, and ranging data 
and (2) to transmit telemetry, TV, and emergency keying. 
tween the LM and the MSFN were provided by both the S-band and VHF transceivers,  
and voice communications between the LM and the CSM and EV crewman were provided 
by the VHF transceivers. 
the MSFN by the S-band equipment. 
Voice communications be- 
Telemetry, ranging, and tracking data were transmitted to 
Television signals of excellent quality were received during the two TV transmis-  
sions from the LM. Voice quality was good throughout the rendezvous phase of the 
mission. However, procedural e r r o r s  or improper equipment configuration prevented 
communications between the Mission Control Center and the LM on several  occasions. 
Excellent voice transmissions were received from each of the crewmen during 
EVA. However, the crew did not receive Mission Control Center transmissions re -  
layed through the Texas, Merrit t  Island, Bermuda, and Navy Vanguard stations because 
of improper equipment configurations a t  the network sites.  
The MSFN relay, S-band backup-voice, keying, and steerable-antenna checkouts 
were deleted during LM activation. 
tes t s  were accomplished successfully. 
The VHF B and the secondary S-band backup-voice 
When the PLSS was first used, voice and EMU-data transmissions were poor and 
This difficulty was caused by the PLSS antenna, which had been left in the errat ic .  
stowed position. Voice and data transmissions were good after the antenna w a s  
deployed. 
The LM-pilot push-to-talk switches located on the PLSS umbilical and on the 
attitude-control assembly were inoperative at  approximately 89 hours g. e. t. The LM 
pilot used the VOX mode for transmission during the remainder of the LM operations. 
The problem was attributed to a break in the common w i r e  to the parallel push-to-talk 
switches. 
Apollo 101LM-4 
The LM- 4 communications-system performance was normal during the Apollo 10 
mission. In relation to the communications system, the purpose of the mission was to 
demonstrate the system VHF and S-band performance at  lunar distances and within 
50 000 feet of the lunar surface. Also, the steerable antenna was  to be used for  the 
f i r s t  t ime during flight. 
P M  mode and the relay and backup modes were to be demonstrated. The following 
equipment and modes were tested and verified: high-power and low-power S-band 
transmission, high-bit-rate and low-bit-rate FM and PM, omnidirectional and s teer-  
able antennas, basic up-link and down-link modes, backup modes, and PRN ranging. 
To test  the system for  the lunar-landing mission, the full-up- 
During lunar revolution 4, the relay tes t s  were deleted because of lack of time. 
During revolution 10, additional communications tes t s  (including tes t s  of S-band and 
VHF-simplex and VHF-duplex modes) were made. For  the res t  of the mission, the 
"basic" communications configuration was  used; during revolution 14, the MSFN 
S-band-relay mode was verified. 
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During the initial LM checkout, MSFN voice was  received by the LM, but the 
MSFN could not receive voice from the LM because the "voice/off/down-voice backup" 
switch had been left in the off position. 
backup,'' and the LM-voice reception was loud and clear at  the MSFN. 
The switch w a s  positioned to "down-voice 
During revolution 10 while a VHF communications checkout was  being conducted 
(94:47 g. e. t .),  the CSM did not receive VHF voice from the LM on duplex B or  simplex 
A. Analysis indicated that the LM-pilot audio circuit breaker was open during the 
VHF-communications checkout. Thus, keying power to the V H F  A transmitter was  
interrupted, and voice communication from the LM on channel A was impossible. 
During revolution 12 with the communications system in the basic mode (using 
the S-band steerable antenna), S-band voice and data were lost a t  99:08 g. e. t . ,  and the 
S-band steerable antenna drove into the stops. After repositioning, the antenna reac- 
quired good voice and data. 
When the LM was 50 000 feet above the lunar surface, the S-band antenna would 
not track, and voice communications were intermittent. Crew debriefing revealed that 
the S-band antenna possibly could have been either in the manual-slew position or  off. 
Because the S-band automatic-tracking mode of the steerable antenna had been demon- 
strated before and after descent, antenna failure was considered unlikely. 
Apollo lllLM-5 
The communications system for LM-5 was basically the same as the system on 
LM-4 except that EV equipment and the S-band erectable antenna were added for lunar- 
surface operations and that feedthrough diodes were not removed from the SPA. 
The performance of the communications system was normal. All  preseparation 
S-band and VHF tests were completed successfully. However, some difficulties were 
experienced with the steerable antenna during the descent to the lunar surface. P r io r  
to a scheduled 180" roll  maneuver, the signal strength dropped below the tracking level, 
and the antenna broke lock several  times. After the maneuver was completed, new 
look angles were used, and the antenna acquired the up-link signal and tracked normally 
throughout landing. The problem was attributed to vehicle blockage and possible multi- 
path reflections from the lunar surface. 
During EVA on the lunar surface, the LM relay provided good voice and EMU 
data. Occasional breakup of the LM pilot's voice occurred in the EVCS-relay mode. 
The probable cause was that the sensitivity of the VOX on the commander's audio cen- 
t e r  was set inadvertently at  l ess  than the maximum sensitivity specified. During EVA, 
the MSFN received an intermittent echo of the up-link transmissions, probably because 
of signal coupling between the headset and the microphone. 
was good throughout EVA. 
during the lift-off and throughout the ascent. 
Television transmission 
The LM-voice and LM-data communications were normal 
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE MANNED-SPACECRAFT PROGRAMS 
As a result of approximately 7 years  of experience in the development of commu- 
nications systems for lunar-orbit and lunar-surface operations, the procedures and 
techniques used during this period can be evaluated for usefulness on future programs. 
Some procedures and techniques can and should be used; others should not. These rec-  
ommendations a r e  outlined in the following paragraphs. 
M a n  age rn en  t Recom men dat i on s 
The management of the system should be totally in one division. Support f rom 
other divisions with special technical capabilities and from outside contractors should 
be encouraged. The preliminary-design reviews and the critical-design reviews should 
be continued. 
More emphasis should be placed on interface requirements. Engineering evalu- 
ations should be made to determine interface effects early in the program: for example, 
evaluation should be made of cabin noise and its effect on communications; of airflow 
to determine i ts  effect on communications; and of pressure environments that could 
cause corona. Early evaluations may save many redesigns and retests  la ter  in the 
program. 
No schedule benefits wi l l  be obtained through greatly reduced reliability and 
quality requirements. A poor reliability- and quality-assurance program offers appar- 
ent schedule and cost advantages, but these advantages soon vanish in the maze Of 
equipment failures and rework efforts that result in unanticipated cost increases and 
delays. 
Ground-support-equipment procurement should be under the control of system 
engineering at the contractor facility and particularly under the control of the cognizant 
engineer responsible for the related flight hardware. 
Contracts to the second-tier vendor level should be avoided when possible because 
of the reduction in program visibility and the increase in turnaround response time. 
To establish requirements for a system design, all affected organizations (such 
as flight operations, flight crew support, flight crews, and training) should be repre-  
sented in the initial design phases of a program, 
number of changes necessary during la ter  program phases and would reduce cost and 
schedule impacts, 
This procedure would reduce the 
Quality control and process control should be emphasized strongly, particularly 
at the component level. Time and money spent on these controls at the beginning of a 
program will alleviate later schedule slippage and cost increases.  (An example is the 
large number of quality problems regarding integrated circuits and t ransis tors  that 
occurred late in the Apollo Program. In some cases ,  the quality problems caused 
equipment retrofitting and schedule slippage. ) 
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Procurement  Recommendations 
Each procurement activity by the contractor and subcontractors should use a 
specific design specification for each item purchased and a separate, general 
environmental-control specification. Each design specification then can reference 
particular parameters  of the environmental-control specification. 
To establish packaging uniformity, a packaging specification should be used. The 
packaging specification should be updated and enforced as a standard mechanical- 
packaging document. To ensure that assemblies a r e  not damaged during shipment, 
handling specifications and transportation specifications should be used. Shipping con- 
tainers should provide protection from all environments during shipment f rom vendor 
to contractor. 
Design specifications should be more stringent at the black-box level than at the 
system level so that (after adding all worst-case specification tolerances) end-to-end 
system requirements will always be met. 
The system-engineering requirements should be specified to the vendor as soon 
as possible, and the vendor should be responsible for the assembly-engineering speci- 
fication. A system input-output specification is needed before a contract is .issued. 
Throughout the LM program, continual compatibility problems occurred between 
flight equipment and GSE. A single vendor for both types of equipment is recommended, 
and contracts should contain a compatibility requirement. 
All signal and control interfaces should be examined by a CCB or a configuration- 
control panel. 
Calibration data should be defined as a function of temperature and voltage range, 
and the calibration range should be a minimum of five data points. 
Processing techniques, inspections, traceability to par t s  level, and requirements 
on wire quality should be specified during procurement of integrated circuits. 
Testing Recommendations 
Time is not saved nor is equipment confidence gained in a qualification-test pro- 
gram that uses  qualification hardware not built to  production-model requirements. The 
EVCS-qualification program was very uneventful because of the high quality of the test 
moael. Qualification-test models had to be modified on some of the LM ERA'S because 
the original models were not of final flight configuration. 
Heavy emphasis should be placed on early procurement of long-leadtime compo- 
nents SO that qualification testing can be early and meaningful enough to support the 
program. As  early in the program as possible, the system should be tested for  envi- 
ronmental compatibility (for example, EMI, vibration, and thermal vacuum compati- 
bility). Environmental t es t s  should be performed on the complete spacecraft, insofar 
as practical. Preinstallation testing should be performed on all flight hardware. 
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Protective devices should be included in all test  equipment that supplies power 
and signals to flight equipment. Undetectable incipient damage to flight hardware may 
result if adequate protection is not provided. Protective devices should be provided 
fo r  exposed equipment such as antennas. Calibrated tools should be provided f o r  all 
hand operations. 
Every effort should be made to ensure commonality between the contractor tes t s  
and KSC tests, especially when the tes ts  are identical. Test  techniques and equipment 
differed during the Apollo tests, and correlation of test resul ts  was practically 
impossible. 
The Apollo Program experience should be used when qualifying hardware. When 
the Apollo Program first began, the tes t  programs were numerous and included many 
environmental tes ts  that later were eliminated. On communications systems, the most 
meaningful environmental tes ts  were the thermal vacuum, vibration, and shock tests.  
Operations Recommendations 
Vendor drawings and other documentation should be available during flight opera- 
tions for  real-time troubleshooting or  anomaly investigations. Switching of communi- 
cations modes (at the expense of flexibility) is recommended to prevent a recurrence of 
the confusion that was caused by improper switch positioning on the LM-3 and LM-4 
flights. 
Design Recommendations 
The communications systems should be pressurized for  corona-free operations. 
Although other corona-suppressing techniques are lighter in weight, variations in 
workmanship, manufacturing reliability, and quality- and process-control problems 
can cause repeated rework and redesign. 
impacts could be eliminated if the equipment is pressurized initially. 
The resulting excessive costs and program 
Do not use inflexible design techniques (for example, cordwood circuits or printed 
wiring) for  critical E m ' s  (for example, the SPA). Design for  flexibility (for example, 
point-to-point wiring) so that changes can be incorporated with minimum cost and 
schedule impact. 
High-reliability systems should not use electromechanical devices. The f i r s t  and 
only EVCS field failure was caused by an R F  relay. When the EVCS preliminary-design 
review was conducted, relays were selected over pin diodes fo r  R F  switches. This 
selection was largely because of contractor-derived trade-offs, which were suspected 
at the time; but, because of schedule commitments, these trade-offs could not be 
studied further. 
A s  for system design where a relay technique is employed, total system studies 
must be performed to ensure that parameters (such as total loop gain, total loop noise, 
and total VOX time constants) are acceptable. Automatic volume controls should be 
designed carefully. 
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Do not braze electronic case structures.  For example, SPA and steerable- 
antenna electronics-box failures occurred because of a marginal braze structural  
design. 
Cases for electronic equipment should be "hogged" out of solid billets. Initially, 
this process would seem more costly, but (because the strength-to-weight ratio is 
best) program costs will  be l e s s  because there will  be no crack failures to repair .  
Do not use elapsed-time indicators on flight equipment. Experience has shown 
that test  time did not approach operating life and that adequate records were kept on 
limited-life equipment. 
L Do not use the "pigtail concept." Bulkhead connectors should be used to improve 
ERA handling and EM1 characteristics. 
The effect of cable capacitance on signal performance may sometimes be over- 
looked. Therefore, close monitoring of this parameter is recommended. 
Use coaxial connectors with hex coupling nuts so that they can be torqued easily. 
Torque all coaxial connectors during installation on the vehicle. 
Provide inflight telemetry on critical parameters that normally a r e  not received 
a t  the ground station (for example, VHF AGC measurements or communications 
parameters  between spacecraft). This provision would have been extremely helpful 
in postflight evaluations of communications - system performance. 
Give ser ious consideration to inertial guidance control of any automatic earth- 
tracking antenna for primary-system tracking. This method would require l e s s  crew 
participation. Circuit complexity also could be reduced, depending on mission 
requirements. 
To  reduce the tape budget for  onboard voice tape recorders,  use VOX control on 
the recorder.  
Use remote multiplexing techniques with digital interfaces to minimize airframe 
wiring. U s e  reprogramable or  easily replaceable format generators to minimize 
changes to a i r f rame wiring caused by measurement requirement changes. 
Protect all signal and power inputs against overvoltages up to the maximum volt- 
ages permitted by the current s ta te  of the a r t .  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Development of the lunar module communications system began approximately 
2 years after the command and service module communications-system development. 
Although a commonality concept was planned to reduce the impact of the schedule differ- 
ence, commonality generally proved unfeasible .because of the lunar module weight and 
power restrictions.  Also, because of the schedule difference, many of the early devel- 
opmental and qualification-test programs had to be eliminated or  reduced. In fact, the 
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entire packaging concept was  changed and the attendant integration effort was reduced 
to alleviate schedule problems. 
New requirements following the accident involving the f i r s t  manned command 
module resulted in significant modifications to the system. Qualification of the system 
had been accomplished before this t ime; but, as a consequence of the design changes, 
delta-qualification tes ts  had to be performed. Delta-qualification tes ts  also were nec- 
essary because of the change in workmanship acceptance and related qualification-test 
vibration levels. 
The success of the extravehicular-communications-system program can be attrib- 
uted to close technical liaison between the Manned Spacecraft Center and the vendor and 
to a realistic but thorough reliability and quality program that allowed quick reaction 
and flexibility. 
The successful development of the lunar module communications system into an 
operational system w a s  difficult in many areas ,  relatively easy in other a reas ,  but 
challenging in all a reas .  The missions through the completion of Apollo 11 demon- 
strated effectivity of the system, compatibility of the system with other lunar module 
systems and with command and service module and Manned Space Flight Network com- 
munications systems, and capability of the system to support a lunar-landing mission. 
No system failures were encountered during the missions through Apollo 11, and the 
system has exceeded the operational requirements. 
Manned Spacecraft Center 
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